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EMPLOYMENT LAW—WELCOME TO THE  JUNGLE1: SALESPE­
OPLE AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXEMPTION TO THE FAIR LABOR 
STANDARDS ACT 
INTRODUCTION 
The landscape of working life in America has undergone a sea 
change since the dawn of our young country.2  As our nation has 
industrialized and technology has advanced, so too have employers’ 
expectations of their workers.  However, as job duties evolve, it has 
become increasingly difficult to characterize whether a particular 
job fits into traditional labor law norms of jobs protected by the 
Fair Labor Standards Act. 
Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act3 (FLSA) in 
1938 as New Deal legislation4 with the purpose of “neutraliz[ing] 
the ‘twin evils’ of overwork and underpay.”5  Pursuant to such 
goals, Congress set limitations on weekly working hours by estab­
lishing an overtime pay requirement.6  The FLSA dictates that em­
ployers requiring their employees to work in excess of the statutory 
maximum must pay an overtime rate “not less than one and one-
half times” the employee’s usual rate of pay.7  Congress, however, 
indicated exceptions to the overtime pay requirement for “any em­
ployee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or profes­
sional capacity.”8 
1. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE 1 (Doubleday, 1st ed. 1906).  Upton Sinclair’s 
novel exemplifies the horrific working conditions in America which led to the eventual 
passing of the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938. 
2. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING  OFFICE,  FAIR  LABOR  STANDARDS  ACT, 
WHITE-COLLAR  EXEMPTIONS IN THE  MODERN  WORK  PLACE, GAO/HEHS-99-164, 1 
(1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99164.pdf (indicating “the indus­
trial profile of the American economy has shifted dramatically”). 
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006). 
4. Craig A. Cunningham, Note, Mind the Gap: A Legal and Economic Analysis of 
Stockbroker Overtime Eligibility Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 2009 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1243, 1246 (2009); see also Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: 
Maximum Struggle for a Minimum Wage, 101 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 22, 22 (1978). 
5. Regan C. Rowan, Comment, Solving the Bluish Collar Problem: An Analysis of 
the DOL’s Modernization of the Exemptions to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 U. PA. 
J. LAB. &  EMP. L. 119, 119 (2004). 
6. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2006). 
7. Id. 
8. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006).  The FLSA indicates exemptions for other cate­
gories of workers such as, among others, computer technicians and farm workers. See 
205 
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206 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:205 
Although the employment landscape in the United States has 
changed dramatically, the exemptions to the FLSA’s overtime re­
quirements remained largely untouched for over fifty years.9  The 
outdated exemptions have been the source of much dispute, re­
cently causing the Department of Labor (DOL) to promulgate 
amended regulations and issue guidance documents clarifying their 
application.10  Unfortunately, attempts to clarify the exemptions 
have only confused the issue further.11 
Due to the vagueness of the regulations regarding the adminis­
trative employee exemption, the circuits have split over whether to 
find certain types of employees exempt.  In particular, courts have 
struggled with how to classify salespeople.12  Courts examining the 
exempt status of salespeople have come down on opposite sides, 
often in cases involving similar fact patterns.13  Perhaps because a 
salesperson’s primary job duties straddle both exempt (marketing) 
and not exempt (sales) duties, courts have varied in determining 
whether salespeople are entitled to overtime compensation. 
29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2)-(b)(30).  A discussion of exemptions other than the administra­
tive exemption is outside the scope of this Note. 
9. U.S. GEN ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 3. 
10. Cunningham, supra note 4, at 1246-48 (referencing the regulations codified at 
29 C.F.R. § 541 (2004)).  This Note will examine only the administrative exemption. 
For an in-depth look at the other exemptions, see Peter M. Panken, The 2004 Revisions 
to the Overtime Regulations under the Fair Labor Standards, in 2 AIRLINE AND RAIL­
ROAD LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 1027 
(2004); Joseph E. Tilson, Jeremy Glenn & Nicholas Strohmayer, Hot Topics in Wage 
and Hour Law, in 2 38TH  ANNUAL  INSTITUTE ON  EMPLOYMENT  LAW 681 (Practising 
Law Institute 2009). 
11. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING  OFFICE, supra note 2, at 23.  Employers 
complained that the duties prong of the test was “confusing and applied in an inconsis­
tent manner by the DOL,” while DOL investigators claimed “determinations about 
independent judgment and discretion [could] be the most difficult part of a compliance 
review.”  Employees complained that “classifi[cation] as an exempt [status had] been 
increasingly simplified by judicial opinions,” resulting in “few protections remain[ing]” 
for particular types of employees. 
12. For the purposes of this Note, the terms “salespeople” and “sales personnel” 
will refer to employees who are paid on a salary, rather than an hourly basis. Workers 
paid on an hourly basis do not fall within the exemptions to the FLSA discussed in this 
Note.  29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006).  At the same time, the scope of the term “salespe­
ople” will exclude outside sales workers, who are addressed in a separate exemption to 
the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). 
13. See, e.g., In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011); Reiseck v. Universal Commc’n of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d 
101 (2d Cir. 2010); Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 587 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 2416 (2010). Contra Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280 (3d 
Cir. 2010); Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2008); Cash v. Cycle Craft 
Co. Inc., 508 F.3d 680 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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207 2012] SALESPEOPLE AND FLSA EXEMPTIONS 
This Note will examine how the FLSA classifies salespeople, 
and will conclude that salespeople should not be classified as ad­
ministrative employees exempt from overtime wages pursuant to 
the FLSA.  Part I will examine the background and history of the 
FLSA, including the administrative exemption.  Part II will high­
light several recent decisions among the various circuits reaching 
different conclusions regarding salespeople and the administrative 
exemption.  Part III will examine the DOL’s interpretation of the 
exempt status of salespeople.  In Part IV, this Note will argue that 
sales personnel in today’s service-based economy mirror the line 
workers contemplated by the FLSA in the production-based econ­
omy at the time the statute was originally enacted.  As such, the 
protections within the FLSA for production workers should apply 
to sales personnel. 
This Note will argue further that the DOL’s position regarding 
the classification of salespeople is entitled to deference.  In an effort 
to clarify their status, the DOL has commented several times re­
cently on the application of the administrative exemption to sales 
personnel.  Specifically, the DOL has interpreted the FLSA to indi­
cate that salespeople are entitled to overtime pay.14  Because the 
DOL has been charged with the duty of enforcing the FLSA, the 
agency is entitled to deference regarding its interpretations of the 
statute, both in terms of the recent regulations and the more infor­
mal interpretive rules.  As an expert in the field, the DOL is in the 
best position to speak to the application of the FLSA.  Courts 
should defer to the DOL’s interpretation of both the FLSA and its 
own regulations, as the Second Circuit has rightly done.15  As a gen­
eral rule, courts should find that salespeople are not administrative 
14. The DOL has indicated that the “‘exemptions to the Act are to be narrowly 
construed against the employer[ ].’” See, e.g., Brief for the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 7 In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 
F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-0437), 2009 WL 3405861 [hereinafter Amicus Brief]; 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 
2010-1 (Mar. 24, 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/adminIntrprtn/ 
FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_1.htm [hereinafter ADMINISTRATOR’S  INTERPRETATION  NO. 
2010-1] (both quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)).  Addi­
tionally, the DOL has deemed the production/administration dichotomy a useful tool in 
evaluating the exempt status of sales personnel. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRE­
TATION NO. 2010-1, supra. See infra Part III. 
15. See, e.g., In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011); Reiseck v. Universal Commc’n of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d 
101 (2d Cir. 2010); Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 587 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 2416 (2010). 
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208 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:205 
employees pursuant to the FLSA, and are therefore entitled to 
overtime compensation. 
Such an application of the FLSA is necessary to promote the 
uniformity of its application.  A uniform classification of salespe­
ople will ensure protection to the greatest number of workers.  It 
will also promote a just administration of the Act.  It would be fun­
damentally unfair for similarly situated workers within the same in­
dustry to be subjected differently to the Act’s overtime provisions. 
At the same time, employers need guidance in classifying workers 
in order to avoid the unfair surprise of costly judgments regarding 
overtime wages.  A uniform standard of classification would pre­
vent costly misclassification and prevent some companies from hav­
ing an arbitrary economic advantage over their competition 
because they were permitted to avoid paying overtime wages. 
Deference to the DOL’s limited application of the administra­
tive exemption ensures the most protection to the greatest number 
of workers.  Such a limited application is particularly appropriate in 
the current dim economic climate. 
I. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT AND “WHITE
 
COLLAR” EMPLOYEES
 
A.	 History of the Overtime Requirement of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act 
The current landscape of American employment only mini­
mally resembles the setting as it existed a century ago.16  After the 
Civil War and subsequent Reconstruction Era, the United States 
began a period of industrialization that dramatically altered work­
ing conditions.17  Although the Industrial Revolution benefitted the 
United States both in terms of economics and lifestyle, working 
conditions for the American worker disintegrated.18  This period of 
devastating economic and social conflict escalated into the Great 
Depression.19  In answer to the economic and social crisis of the 
time, Congress and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt enacted 
16. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 1 (indicating “the 
industrial profile of the American economy has shifted dramatically”). 
17. Pamela N. Williams, Historical Overview of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 10 
FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 657, 658 (2009). 
18. Id.  Services for Americans improved, such as transportation and improved 
food processing, but to the detriment of the conditions of the factories that provided 
such conveniences. Id. 
19. Id. at 660. 
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209 2012] SALESPEOPLE AND FLSA EXEMPTIONS 
legislation to address, among other concerns, the existing labor and 
employment issues.20 
On June 25, 1938, President Roosevelt signed into law the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, one of the pillars of Roosevelt’s “New Deal” 
legislation.21  The FLSA included in its mission a standard for mini­
mum wages and maximum hours for the working American.22  Spe­
cifically, the FLSA established criteria to eliminate “labor 
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum stan­
dard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-be­
ing of workers.”23  Implicitly, the legislation was meant “to ensure 
employees a reasonable quality of life outside the workplace.”24  To 
this end, the FLSA instituted an overtime pay requirement, man­
dating that employers pay “a rate . . . one and one-half times the 
[usual] rate” for hours worked in excess of the statutory maximum 
weekly hour allowance.25 
B.	 Exemptions to the FLSA Overtime Requirement for 
Administrative Employees 
The policy goals of the FLSA overtime requirements were 
threefold: “a shorter work week, compensation for overworked em­
ployees, and work spreading (or ‘work sharing’).”26  The DOL has 
referred to the overtime requirements as “‘among the nation’s most 
important worker protections.’”27  However, these requirements 
were never intended to extend to the more affluent, or white-collar 
worker.28  The original form of the FLSA exempted from the Act’s 
wage and hour standards those “employee[s] employed in a bona 
20. Id.; see also Grossman, supra note 4 (describing how prior to FLSA, President 
Roosevelt enacted the National Industrial Recovery Act [NIRA] “‘to raise wages, cre­
ate employment, and thus restore business’”).  The National Labor Relations Act, or 
Wagner Act, “which ‘guaranteed the rights of workers to join labor unions and to bar­
gain collectively with their employers’” was also enacted prior to the FLSA. Williams, 
supra note 17, at 667. 
21.	 Cunningham, supra note 4, at 1245-46. 
22.	 Id.; see also Grossman, supra note 4. 
23.	 Cunningham, supra note 4, at 1246 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006)). 
24.	 Id. 
25.	 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1938). 
26.	 Rowan, supra note 5, at 123. 
27. Steven I. Locke, The Fair Labor Standards Act Exemptions and the Pharma­
ceutical Industry: Are Sales Representatives Entitled to Overtime?, 13 BARRY L. REV. 1, 
3 (2009) (quoting Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Defining and Delimiting the 
Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer 
Employees; Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122-23 (Apr. 23, 2004) (codified at 29 C.F.R. 
§ 541) [hereinafter “Final Rule”]). 
28.	 See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 4, at 1246; Rowan, supra note 5, at 124-25. 
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210 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:205 
fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity.”29  White-
collar employees did not need the protections of the FLSA, due to 
the higher salary, potential for promotion, and greater job security 
associated with the typical white-collar position.30  The FLSA 
charged the DOL with the duty of establishing the standards for the 
white-collar exemptions.31  To that end, the DOL formulated spe­
cific regulatory tests to determine which employees fell within the 
white-collar exemptions to the Act’s wage and hour requirements.32 
Prior to 2004, the DOL regulations indicated an employee 
must meet each of the requirements of a three-part test in order to 
be considered an exempt white-collar worker.33  Particularly, the 
employee first must have been paid on a salary, rather than an 
hourly basis (the salary-basis test).  The amount of the employee’s 
salary must have been sufficient to indicate managerial or profes­
sional status (the salary-level test).  Finally, the employee’s job du­
ties must have involved managerial or professional skills.34  At this 
time, the statutory regulatory requirements for white-collar workers 
had changed little since 1954, the changes limited mostly to in­
creases in the dollar amount within the salary-level test.35 
According to the statutory test, an employee who was compen­
sated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $250 per 
29. 29 U.S.C.§ 213(a)(1) (2006).  The specific white-collar exemption relevant to 
this Note is the administrative exemption.  Although the legislative history of the FLSA 
does not indicate an explanation for the exemption, the Minimum Wage Study Com­
mission of 1981 asserted the “white collar” exemptions were warranted on the basis of 
the managerial and professional nature of these types of jobs. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNT­
ING OFFICE, supra note 2 at 5. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 1. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 2. 
35. Id. at 3.  Prior to the 2004 Amendments, the DOL applied a “long test” to 
employees earning less than $250 per week, and a “short test” to employees earning 
$250 per week or more.  The long and short tests were designed as part of the duties test 
with the presumption that an employee’s higher salary level directly correlated to the 
type of job duties he performed, thereby reducing the analysis required of the courts in 
examining whether the employee’s job duties indicated an exempt status. See U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 7 tbl. 1. For further analysis of the “short 
test,” see Rowan, supra note 5, at 128-29 (citing HARRY WEISS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, 
WAGE & HOUR  DIV., REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS ON  PROPOSED  REVISIONS FOR 
REGULATIONS, PART 541, at 22 (1949)) (explaining the rationale behind the short tests). 
Over time, the “short test” became the test applied most often, as the salary level was 
last adjusted in 1975, and was not established to adjust with inflation.  As a result, the 
majority of workers eventually qualified for the “short test.”  Rowan, supra note 5, at 
128-29. 
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211 2012] SALESPEOPLE AND FLSA EXEMPTIONS 
week,36 and “[w]hose primary duty consist[ed] of . . . office or non-
manual work directly related to management policies or general 
business operations of the employer . . .; and [w]hich . . . requir[ed] 
the exercise of discretion and independent judgment”37 fell within 
the boundaries of the administrative exemption.  Generally, the re­
quirement that exempt employees exercise independent judgment 
and discretion indicated that they “ha[d] the freedom to make 
choices about matters of significance to their employers, without 
immediate supervision or detailed guidelines.”38  Over time, the du­
ties prong of the regulation’s requirement for exempt employees 
became increasingly more difficult to navigate,39 with employers, 
employees, and DOL investigators alike unhappy with its applica­
tion.40  Recognizing how outdated the regulations had become, the 
DOL looked to amend the regulations. 
By the early part of the new millennium, it became increasingly 
clear that the FLSA had begun to show its age.41  Employment law 
scholars complained “[w]ith the advent of the ‘virtual workplace,’ 
telecommuting by employees, and flexible scheduling arrange­
ments, this depression-era statute is starting to show some signs of 
aging, and many . . . have called into question its relevance in the 
modern workplace.”42  As the industrial landscape changed, the 
specific white-collar exemptions to the overtime requirements be­
36. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 7 tbl. 1. 
37. Panken, supra note 10, at 1033. 
38. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 23. 
39. Joseph E. Tilson & Jeremy J. Glenn, New Law, New Cases, and Tough Issues 
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, in 33RD  ANNUAL  INSTITUTE ON  EMPLOYMENT 
LAW 169, 174 (Practising Law Institute 2004). 
40. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING  OFFICE, supra note 2, at 23.  Employers 
complained the duties prong of the test was “confusing and applied in an inconsistent 
manner by the DOL;” while DOL investigators claimed “determinations about inde­
pendent judgment and discretion [could] be the most difficult part of a compliance re­
view.” Id.  Employees complained that classification as an exempt status had been 
“increasingly simplified by judicial opinions,” resulting in “few protections remaining” 
for particular types of employees. Id. at 25; see also Rowan, supra note 5, at 129 (indi­
cating the duties test “proved to be particularly cumbersome for employers.”); G. 
Thomas Harper, DOL dubs new overtime regulations ‘FairPay Initiative,’ but opponents 
cry foul, FLA. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (May 2004), available at http://www.harpergerlach. 
com/FELL/FELLMay04.pdf (“The regulations and case law were imprecise, convo­
luted, confusing, and often contradictory.”). 
41. Tilson & Glenn, supra note 39, at 169; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OF­
FICE, supra note 2, at 1 (“Critics of the FLSA claim that [the] shift [from a manufactur­
ing-based to a service-oriented economy] as well as the increased use of sophisticated 
technology, have left the FLSA and its regulations outdated and in need of revision.”). 
42. Tilson & Glenn, supra note 39, at 169. 
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212 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:205 
came more difficult to administer as well.43  At the time the FLSA 
was adopted, the economy was primarily agricultural and manufac­
turing-based.44  The white-collar exemptions were applicable in the 
economic setting of the time.  In particular, the boundaries of 
white-collar workers’ decision-making responsibilities were clearly 
defined, such workers were more likely to be management, and 
white-collar workers were better compensated than their modern 
day counterparts.45 
As the economy moved to a more service-oriented employee 
base, the number of American workers qualifying for exemption 
under the FLSA wage and hour requirements increased exponen­
tially.46  In 1998, for example, the service industries employed 24 
million full-time workers, approximately double the number of ser­
vice industry workers employed in 1983.47  Nearly one quarter of all 
workers in the United States was employed in the service industry 
in 1998, making the service industry the largest employment sec­
tor.48  Many argued this paradigm shift left the white-collar exemp­
tions to the FLSA largely inapplicable to the current workforce.49 
The DOL recognized that the exemptions to the FLSA wage 
and hour overtime requirements had largely become ineffective.50 
On April 23, 2004, the DOL promulgated what it deemed a “Final 
Rule” defining and delimiting the exemptions for white-collar em­
ployees.51  According to the DOL, the purpose of the new regula­
43. Rowan, supra note 5, at 121 (“[T]he DOL’s failure to modernize the tests to 
reflect changing labor conditions has muddied the regulatory waters.”); see also Harper, 
supra note 40, at 1 (“Over the last decade or two, employers have found it increasingly 
difficult to decide which employees are entitled to overtime and which are not.”). 
44. Rowan, supra note 5, at 119. 
45. Michael A. Faillace, Automatic Exemption of Highly-Paid Employees and 
Other Proposed Amendments to the White-Collar Exemptions: Bringing the Fair Labor 
Standards Act into the 21st Century, 15 LAB. LAW. 357, 358 (2000) (describing the char­
acteristics of white-collar workers at the time the FLSA was adopted). 
46. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 8. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. See, e.g., id. at 21 (stating that discussions with employers and politicians 
demonstrated that many believed the “traditional limits of the white-collar exemptions 
[were] outdated in the modern work place”). 
50. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,122 (“The . . . overtime pay requirement . . . 
protections have been severely eroded . . . because the [DOL] has not updated the 
regulations [applicable to white-collar employees].”). 
51. Final Rule, supra note 27.  The new regulations increased the salary level ap­
plicable to administrative employees for the first time since 1975. Id. at 22,166.  Setting 
the new salary level required to meet exempt status at $455 per week, the DOL be­
lieved it had struck a balance between properly defining the limits of the white-collar 
employees without improperly disqualifying a large number of employees from exemp­
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tions was fourfold.  First, revisions to the tests for exempt 
employees were needed “to restore the overtime protections in­
tended by the FLSA which ha[d] eroded over decades.”52  Second, 
the DOL intended the new regulations to reflect both changes in 
the workplace and developments in federal case law surrounding 
the exemptions to the FLSA since the Act had last been 
amended.53  Changes to the confusing and complex regulations 
were necessary to prevent unethical employers from using the un­
certainty of the regulations to their advantage and refusing to pay 
overtime to employees where it was due.54  Additionally, confusing 
regulations would have the effect of creating “a trap for the un­
wary” employer who honestly could not determine whether to clas­
sify certain employees as exempt.55  Finally, the DOL sought to 
prevent employees from resorting to expensive and time consuming 
litigation to obtain overtime pay that was rightfully theirs.56  In the 
Preamble to the new regulations, the DOL indicated it would vio­
late its statutory duty to “‘define and delimit’ the section 13(a)(1) 
exemptions ‘from time to time’” if it allowed more time to pass 
without updating the regulations.57 
In addition to adjusting the salary level upwards, the new regu­
lations made changes to the much-litigated “duties” test.58  These 
changes were merely a watered-down version of those that were 
proposed, however.59  While the proposed regulations eliminated 
much of the ambiguous language that had been the source of litiga­
tion,60 the Final Rule diluted many of these changes, largely in re­
sponse to complaints offered during the public comment period.61 
However, the final version of the new regulations added a new re­
quirement to “‘discretion and independent judgment,’” such that 
tion. Id. at 22,171.  Although the new regulations did not index the newly amended 
salary levels for inflation, partly because the DOL believed the FLSA did not grant it 
such authority, the DOL promised to update the salary levels more frequently. Id. at 
22,171-72.  A discussion of the salary test is not relevant to this Note. 
52. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,122. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id.  For a discussion of the changes to the regulations in 2004, see supra notes 
50-55 and accompanying text; infra notes 57-70 and accompanying text. 
57. Id. 
58. Adam T. Klein, Mark R. Humowiecki, Tarik F. Ajami & Cara E. Greene, The 
DOL’s New FLSA White Collar Exemption Regulations and Working with the DOL on 
FLSA Actions, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 459, 466 (2006). 
59. Id. at 466; see also Harper, supra note 40. 
60. Rowan, supra note 5, at 133. 
61. Id. 
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214 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:205 
the “primary duty must include ‘the exercise of discretion and inde­
pendent judgment with respect to matters of significance.’”62  The 
2004 Final Rule attempted to clarify the new requirements of the 
duties test with reference to case law, stating “the exercise of discre­
tion and independent judgment ‘involves the comparison and the 
evaluation of possible courses of conduct and acting or making a 
decision after the various possibilities have been considered.’ The 
term ‘matters of significance’ refers to the level of importance or 
consequence of the work performed.”63 
While the new rules added the “matters of significance” re­
quirement, they elected to retain the production/administration di­
chotomy test.64  Specifically, the new rules retained the requirement 
that exempt employees perform “office or non-manual work di­
rectly related to the management or general business operations of 
the employer . . . .”65  In an attempt to clarify which employees 
would be considered exempt based on the performance of work, 
the new regulations listed examples of exempt work: “tax; finance; 
accounting; budgeting; auditing; insurance; quality control; purchas­
ing; procurement; advertising; marketing; research; safety and 
health; personnel management; human resources; employee bene­
fits; labor relations; public relations; government relations; com­
puter network, internet and database administration; legal and 
regulatory compliance; and similar activities.”66 
Notwithstanding the DOL’s attempts to clarify and streamline 
the white-collar exemptions,67 response to the new regulations was 
not positive.68  Many argued the new regulations did little to effec­
tuate the necessary change.69  General agreement could not be 
reached regarding which employees would or would not be consid­
ered exempt under the new regulations.70  The significant rise in 
62. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,139 (emphasis added). 
63. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,139 (citing Bothell v. Phrase Metrics, Inc., 299 
F.3d 1120, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
64. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,139. 
65. Id. at 22,137. 
66. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201 (2004). 
67. Klein, Humowiecki, Ajami & Greene, supra note 58, at 465. 
68. See, e.g., Klein, Humowiecki, Ajami & Greene, supra note 58; Harper, supra 
note 40. 
69. See, e.g., Klein, Humowiecki, Ajami & Greene, supra note 58, at 465 (“While 
the DOL initially sought to substantially revise the duties test, the final version largely 
mirrors the short test under the old regulations.”); Harper, supra note 40, at 2 (“The 
changes made to the exempt duties tests have turned out to be a lot less dramatic than 
some of the language that was included in the proposed regulations.”). 
70. Cunningham, supra note 4, at 1247. 
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215 2012] SALESPEOPLE AND FLSA EXEMPTIONS 
multibillion dollar class action lawsuits regarding overtime claims in 
recent years71 indicates that even under the new regulations, the 
exemptions are frequently misunderstood, leading to misclassifica­
tion by employers.72 
Perhaps the most significant problem with the new regulations 
lies in the fact that some employees, particularly salespeople, often 
perform job duties that can be construed as both exempt and non­
exempt.73  For example, while under the new regulations an em­
ployee must have the authority to make an independent decision 
without immediate direction or supervision in order to qualify as 
exempt,74 the requirement will still be satisfied if there is review of 
such decisions by a supervisor.75  In addition, the authority to make 
an independent decision will place an employee within the bounda­
ries of the exemption even if the authority is limited to making a 
recommendation for a particular action rather than taking the ac­
tion itself.76  As a result, litigation regarding whether employees 
can be considered exempt has increased recently rather than de­
creased, resulting in judgments against employers in the hundreds 
of millions of dollars.77  With the new regulations, the road was 
paved for the DOL to extend overtime benefits to salespeople. 
II. CASE LAW REGARDING SALESPEOPLE AND THE
 
ADMINISTRATIVE EXEMPTION
 
Much dissention has arisen among the courts regarding the ex­
empt status of salespeople whose job duties place them potentially 
71. Tilson & Glenn, supra note 39, at 171; see also infra note 275. 
72. Tilson & Glenn, supra note 39, at 174; see also Harper, supra note 40, at 2 
(“That increasingly led to misclassification of workers and lawsuits for unpaid 
overtime.”). 
73. Harper, supra note 40, at 2. 
74. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(c) (2004). 
75. 29 C.F.R. § 541.207(e) (2004). 
76. Id. 
77. Tilson, Glenn & Strohmayer, supra note 10, at 3 (noting that in 2008, Walmart 
settled cases regarding the administrative exemption to FLSA overtime requirements 
for 700 million dollars). See also Frederick C. Leffler et al., Second Circuit Narrowly 
Reads FLSA Exemption in Novartis Ruling, PROSKAUER  ROSE LLP (July 27, 2010), 
http://www.proskauer.com/publications/client-alert/second-circuit-narrowly-reads-flsa­
exemptions-in-novartis-ruling/.  In response to the recent Novartis ruling, “businesses 
which rely heavily on the . . . administrative exemptions may find themselves targets of 
litigation” Id.  At the same time, certiorari was recently denied in the Novartis case, 
leaving the pharmaceutical sales company with a very large standing judgment to pay its 
sales representatives overtime wages. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 
(2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011). See also supra notes 68-69 and 
accompanying text. 
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216 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:205 
both within and outside of the administrative exemption. The fun­
damental difficulty in classifying salespeople lies in the ambiguity of 
the regulatory tests which reviewing courts have struggled to apply. 
The Second Circuit has consistently and correctly held that salespe­
ople cannot be considered “administrative employees” and are, 
therefore, not exempted from the FLSA overtime requirements.78 
Other circuits, however, have inappropriately held the opposite.79 
A.	 Cases Holding Salespeople Not “Administrative Employees” 
Under the FLSA 
Several recent Second Circuit cases have that held salespeople 
are entitled to overtime compensation. These decisions have held 
that salespeople are not administrative employees and therefore 
not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime provisions. The cases focus 
on sales-specific aspects of the salesperson’s duties, although the 
employees in question may also have job duties that fall outside of 
the realm of exempt job duties. 
In Reiseck v. Universal Communications of Miami, Inc., the 
Second Circuit ultimately determined Plaintiff Lynore Reiseck did 
not fall under the administrative exemption.80  As Regional Direc­
tor of Sales, Ms. Reiseck’s job duties involved both direct and indi­
rect sales or sales promotion,81 requiring Ms. Reiseck to “generat[e] 
advertising sales . . . for Universal’s magazine publication, Elite 
Traveler.”82  Ms. Reiseck was paid a base salary with commissions, 
but was paid no overtime during her employ.83 
In evaluating whether Ms. Reiseck’s job duties as a salesperson 
selling advertising space in a magazine qualified her as an adminis­
trative employee exempted from overtime wages,84 the Second Cir­
cuit referenced the second prong of the regulatory test. The test 
78. See, e.g., Novartis, 611 F.3d at 149; Reiseck v. Universal Commc’ns of Miami, 
Inc., 591 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2010); Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 587 F.3d 529 (2d 
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2416 (2010). 
79. See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 
2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 760 (2011); Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280 (3d 
Cir. 2010); Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2008); Cash v. Cycle Craft 
Co., 508 F.3d 680 (1st Cir. 2007). The cases are largely fact-specific.  Indeed, the new 
regulations indicate that “there must be a case-by-case assessment to determine 
whether the employee’s duties meet the requirement for [the] exemption.” Final Rule, 
supra note 27, at 22,144. 
80. Reiseck, 591 F.3d at 108. 
81. Id. at 103. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 105. 
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217 2012] SALESPEOPLE AND FLSA EXEMPTIONS 
required that an exempt employee’s duties be “‘directly related to 
management policies or general business operations . . . .’”85 
The Second Circuit held that because Elite Traveler was dis­
tributed without cost, sale of advertising space was the primary 
source of revenue for the publication,86 and thus was the defen­
dant’s “product.”87  Because the plaintiff’s primary duty was to sell 
a product, she did not qualify as an administrative employee under 
the FLSA.88  The court adopted the reasoning of the Third Circuit 
in Martin v. Cooper Electric Supply Co.89  An employee who makes 
specific sales is not an administrative employee for the purposes of 
the FLSA, while an employee whose primary job responsibility is to 
increase sales among all customers generally falls within the exemp­
tion.90  While the plaintiff arguably had job duties generally pro­
moting the travel magazine’s business in her position as Regional 
Sales Manager, the court looked only to her sales duties in finding 
her an employee eligible for overtime compensation under the 
FLSA.91 
The Second Circuit also addressed the issue of whether sales­
people qualify as administrative employees in Davis v. J.P. Morgan 
Chase.  In Davis, the court held that a class of bank underwriters, 
whose primary job duty was to approve (or “sell”) loans pursuant 
to detailed bank guidelines, qualified as administrative employees 
entitled to overtime pay.92 
In performing their required job duties, the plaintiffs consulted 
detailed bank guidelines, “the Credit Guide,” to determine whether 
loan applicants qualified for a loan.93  The Second Circuit deter­
mined that the plaintiffs did not qualify as administrative employ­
ees, basing its decision on the section of the regulations that 
85. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.2(a) (2004)). 
86. Id. at 106. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 107.  The court referenced the regulations definition of “primary duty” 
as one “that consumes a ‘major part, or over [fifty] percent, of the employee’s time.’” 
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.103 (2004)). 
89. Martin v. Cooper Electric Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1991). 
90. Reiseck, 591 F.3d at 107 (citing Martin, 940 F.2d at 905). 
91. Id. at 108. 
92. Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 587 F.3d 529, 530 (2d Cir. 2009). 
93. Id.  Both the plaintiffs and the bank agreed that underwriters had the power 
to deviate from the Credit Guide and independently evaluate the credit worthiness of 
loan applicants.  However, the parties disagreed over what level of discretion a loan 
underwriter had to make exceptions to the Credit Guide. Id. at 531.  The court ulti­
mately determined this discretion was not enough to bring the plaintiffs within the ad­
ministrative exemption. Id. at 537. 
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218 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:205 
addressed “[t]he production/administration dichotomy.”94  The reg­
ulations further defined work that “related to management policies 
or general business operations . . . [as] ‘those types of activities re­
lating to the administrative operations of a business as distinguished 
from ‘production’ or, in a retail or service establishment, ‘sales’ 
work.’”95 
Relying on a recent analysis of the production/administration 
dichotomy by the DOL, the court held that the primary job duties 
of loan underwriters involved the “production” of loans rather than 
the “general business operations” of the bank.96  Furthermore, the 
bank itself referred to the work of loan underwriters as “production 
work.”97  The court also held that measuring the loan underwriters’ 
output was another indication that the employees in question were 
engaged in production work.98  In short, an underwriter employed 
by the defendant was “directly engaged in creating the ‘goods’— 
loans and other financial services—produced and sold by Chase.”99 
Ultimately, the court concluded that because the plaintiffs’ pri­
mary job function was to carry out the production of the bank’s 
goods (here, loans), they did not perform work directly related to 
management policies or general business operations of the bank.100 
As such, the plaintiffs did not fall within the administrative exemp­
tion to the FLSA.101 
The recent Second Circuit case, In re Novartis Wage and Hour 
Litigation,102 dealt with the issue of whether the administrative ex­
94. Id. at 532.  The court evaluated the exempt status of the underwriters by ap­
plying the regulatory test as it existed prior to the 2004 amendments. Id. at 531 n.2. See 
infra notes 168-169 and accompanying text. 
95. Davis, 587 F.3d at 531 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(a) (2004)) (emphasis 
added). 
96. Id. at 534 (citing DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., OPINION LETTER OF 
FEB. 16, 2001, 2001 WL 1558764, at *1.  Interestingly, the court did not address a 2006 
DOL Wage and Hour Division opinion letter published Sept. 8, 2006, which indicated 
mortgage loan officers were exempt administrative employees.  This opinion letter has 
since been withdrawn by the DOL in an Administrative Interpretation published March 
24, 2010, subsequent to the date of this opinion. See ADMINISTRATOR’S  INTERPRETA­
TION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14; see also discussion infra Part III.A. 
97. Id.  The loan underwriters were not expected to provide customers with ad­
vice regarding which loans best suited their needs, but rather, were primarily expected 
to adhere to the Credit Guide. Davis, 587 F.3d at 534. 
98. Id.  Loan underwriters were compensated based on the number of loans they 
produced that met the standards outlined in the Credit Guide. Id. 
99. Id. at 535. 
100. Id. at 537. 
101. Id. 
102. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011). 
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219 2012] SALESPEOPLE AND FLSA EXEMPTIONS 
emption to the FLSA applied to salespeople in the context of phar­
maceutical sales representatives.103  The plaintiffs, a class of 
approximately 2,500 sales representatives, alleged that Novartis, a 
drug manufacturing company, violated the FLSA by wrongly classi­
fying them as employees exempted from overtime benefits.104 
In concluding that Novartis sales representatives did not qual­
ify as administrative employees, the court focused primarily on an 
amicus brief filed by the Secretary of Labor on behalf of the plain­
tiffs.105  In the brief, the Secretary asserted that because the Novar­
tis representatives did “not exercise discretion and independent 
judgment, they [did not fall] within the . . . ‘administrative’ em­
ployee categor[y] that [was] exempted from the FLSA overtime pay 
requirements.”106  The court deferred to the Secretary of Labor’s 
interpretation of the regulations that the representatives were not 
103. Id. at 144.  The court also reviewed whether the sales representatives were 
exempted from the FLSA’s overtime requirements under the outside salesperson ex­
emption; however, that issue is beyond the scope of this Note. For further discussion on 
the outside salesperson exemption, see Locke, supra note 27. See also Chenensky v. 
New York Life Ins. Co., No. 7 Civ. 11504 (WHP), 2010 WL 2710586 (D.N.Y. June 24, 
2010) (discussing plaintiff who assisted customers in obtaining life insurance products 
conducted “sales” under the FLSA); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 
F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that pharmaceutical sales representatives who pro­
moted drug products to physicians fell within the outside sales exemption).  Because the 
court found the sales representatives to be exempt pursuant to the outside sales exemp­
tion, it did not evaluate them according to the administrative exemption. Id. at 398. 
Contra Ruggeri v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 585 F.Supp.2d 254, 268 (D. 
Conn. 2008) (explaining that pharmaceutical sales representatives “do not and cannot 
make or produce any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for 
sale, or other disposition of Defendant’s products . . .”) (internal quotations omitted). 
104. Novartis, 611 F.3d at 144. 
105. Id. at 149. 
106. Id.  The Secretary of Labor outlined specific aspects of Novartis representa­
tives’ job duties to indicate they did not meet the third prong of the test. When calling 
on physicians, Novartis representatives provide doctors with information regarding 
Novartis products in an effort to persuade them to prescribe Novartis products to their 
patients.  Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 2. See also 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(3) (2004). 
In speaking with doctors, Novartis representatives are required to deliver the com­
pany’s “core message” by means of a scripted dialog.  Amicus Brief, supra note 14 at 3. 
Representatives are not permitted to stray from the script, and if asked a question for 
which they do not have a scripted response, they are instructed to contact their supervi­
sor before providing the physician with an answer. Id. at 6.  Novartis representatives 
must “close” the sale by asking the doctor for a commitment, although non-binding, to 
prescribe Novartis medications. Id. at 5.  Novartis trains its sales representatives in 
sales techniques, and representatives are paid on commission, based on the volume of 
prescriptions written by physicians to whom they are assigned. Id. 
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administrative employees, and held that the Secretary’s interpreta­
tions were entitled to “controlling” deference.107 
The court and the Secretary referenced the section of the regu­
lations indicating that an administrative employee must have pri­
mary job duties that “‘include[ ] the exercise of discretion and 
independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.’”108 
In the Amicus Brief, the Secretary asserted that in order to “exer­
cise discretion and independent judgment,” something more than 
applying techniques or procedures established by the employer was 
needed.109  The level of authority permitted the Novartis represent­
atives was simply not enough to amount to the exercise of discre­
tion and independent judgment.110  Because the court found it 
appropriate to defer to the Secretary’s interpretation, it held that 
the Novartis sales representatives were “not bona fide administra­
tive employees within the meaning of the FLSA and the 
regulations.”111 
B.	 Cases Holding Salespeople “Administrative Employees” 
Under the FLSA 
Some courts have taken the opposite position from those dis­
cussed in the previous section, holding that salespeople should be 
classified as administrative employees and exempted from the over­
time requirements of the FLSA.  Courts that find salespeople to be 
administrative employees focus on the managerial or administrative 
aspects of the salesperson’s duties. 
In the First Circuit case Cash v. Cycle Craft Company, Inc.,112 
the court classified Plaintiff Thomas Cash as an administrative em­
ployee exempt from the FLSA’s overtime provisions.113  Cash was 
hired as “New Purchase/Customer Relations Manager,” responsible 
for sales and solving customer service issues.114  Cycle Craft Com­
pany fired him and Cash subsequently filed suit, alleging, inter alia, 
107. Novartis, 611 F.3d at 149 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)); 
see discussion infra Part IV.C. 
108.	 Novartis, 611 F.3d at 155 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a) (2004)). 
109.	 Id. at 156. 
110.	 Id. 
111.	 Id. at 157. 
112.	 Cash v. Cycle Craft Co., Inc., 508 F.3d 680 (1st Cir. 2007). 
113.	 Id. at 681. 
114.	 Id. 
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221 2012] SALESPEOPLE AND FLSA EXEMPTIONS 
that the dealership had violated the FLSA by not paying overtime 
wages during the course of his employ.115 
On appeal, the First Circuit focused primarily on the second 
and third prongs of the regulatory test. The court analyzed whether 
Cash’s job duties related to management or business operations,116 
and whether he exercised “discretion and independent judgment 
with respect to matters of significance.”117 
The court held that the plaintiff was an administrative em­
ployee, relying on the reasoning from Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. 
Co.118  Applying the third prong of the test, the court held that like 
the plaintiffs in John Alden, Cash was “‘not merely [a] ‘skilled’ 
worker[ ] who operate[d] within a strict set of rules,’”119 but instead 
he exercised discretion in carrying out his job duties. The court in­
dicated, somewhat vaguely, that “Cash exercised discretion in react­
ing to the unique needs of Boston Harley’s customers.”120  The First 
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment that Cash’s job related 
to the management and business operations of the store, and thus 
he qualified as an exempt administrative employee within the 
meaning of the FLSA.121 
The Third Circuit also recently held that a pharmaceutical sales 
representative qualified for the administrative exemption pursuant 
to the FLSA in Smith v. Johnson & Johnson.122  In holding that the 
Plaintiff Patty Lee Smith qualified for the administrative exemp­
tion, the court considered the second and third prongs of the regu­
latory tests.  The court found that because her job possessed 
“independent and managerial qualities,”123 and required a degree 
of planning and foresight to implement a strategic plan, Smith met 
the requirements of an administrative employee.124 
115. Id. at 682.  Cash was fired on the spot due to an emotional problem at work. 
Id. 
116. Id. at 684. 
117. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.200 (2004)). 
118. Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997); see discussion 
infra Part IV.A.2. 
119. Cash, 508 F.3d at 685 (quoting Reich, 126 F.3d at 14). 
120. Id. at 686. 
121. Id. at 681, 685. 
122. Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2010). 
123. Id. at 285. 
124. Id.  The Third Circuit determined that the job duties of Smith satisfied the 
second prong of the test regarding administrative employees because “[h]er non-man­
ual position required her to form a strategic plan designed to maximize sales in her 
territory.” Id.  According to the court, because she followed a strategic plan she devel­
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222 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:205 
Clearly, the courts are not having any less difficulty classifying 
salespeople than are employers, as evinced by the recent divergence 
in outcomes.  Such broad misclassification indicates that a uniform 
system for classifying salespeople is warranted. 
III. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND THE
 
ADMINISTRATIVE EXEMPTION
 
In recent years, the Department of Labor has spoken on sev­
eral occasions regarding its interpretation of the application of the 
administrative exemption.  A clear pattern has emerged, demon­
strating that the DOL, like the Second Circuit, interprets the FLSA 
to indicate that salespeople do not fall within the administrative ex­
emption.125  In addition to the 2004 amendments to the FLSA, 
promulgated through formal notice and comment rulemaking pro­
cedure, the DOL has declared that salespeople qualify for overtime 
through informal guidance documents. 
A.	 The Wage and Hour Opinion Letters Regarding Mortgage 
Loan Officers 
In September 2006, the DOL issued a Wage and Hour Opinion 
Letter indicating that employees who performed duties typical of a 
mortgage loan officer qualified for the administrative exemption to 
the FLSA and were therefore not entitled to overtime pay.126  On 
March 24, 2010, the DOL issued a new type of guidance document, 
described as an “Administrator’s Interpretation” (AI).127  Signifi­
cantly, the AI retracted the DOL’s previous position regarding the 
exempt status of mortgage loan officers indicated in the 2006 Opin­
ion Letter.128  The DOL argued the 2006 Opinion Letter was based 
on “misleading assumption[s] and selective and narrow analysis,”129 
oped on her own, Smith’s job duties directly related to the management or general 
business operations of her employer. Id. 
125. See, e.g., In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011); Reiseck v. Universal Commc’ns of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d 
101, 107 (2d Cir. 2010); Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 587 F.3d 529, 534 (2d Cir. 2009). 
126. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., OPINION LETTER FLSA 2006­
31, at 1-2 (Sept. 8, 2006), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2006/2006_ 
09_08_31_FLSA.pdf .  The DOL referenced job duties such as evaluating customer fi­
nancial criteria to designate the appropriate loan product, responding to customer in­
quiries and advising them about the risks and benefits of various loan products, and 
other ‘“customer-specific persuasive sales activity.’” Id. 
127.	 ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14. 
128.	 Id. 
129. Id. (“Because of its misleading assumption and selective and narrow analy­
sis, Opinion Letter FLSA 2006-31 does not comport with this interpretive guidance and 
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and as such it was compelled to issue a new guidance document 
addressing the issue. 
In the 2006 Opinion Letter, the DOL applied the test enunci­
ated in the 2004 amended regulations in order to determine 
whether mortgage loan officers qualified as administrative employ­
ees.130  The DOL conceded that the newly amended regulations in­
dicated “that employees whose primary duty is inside sales cannot 
qualify as exempt administrative employees,”131 but stated that the 
new regulations further clarified that “many financial services em­
ployees [such as mortgage loan officers] qualify as exempt adminis­
trative employees, even if they are involved in some selling to 
consumers.”132  According to the Opinion Letter, mortgage loan of­
ficers generally had primary job duties other than sales.133  The 
2006 Opinion Letter claimed mortgage loan officers’ job duties in­
dicated they performed “work directly related to the management 
or general business operations of the employer,” meeting the sec­
ond prong of the test.134 
Finally, the 2006 Opinion Letter indicated that mortgage loan 
officers met the third prong of the test and performed duties that 
required the “exercise of discretion and independent judgment.”135 
The Opinion Letter determined the mortgage loan officers quali­
is withdrawn.  Similarly, an Opinion Letter dated February 16, 2001, 2001 WL 1558764, 
also is withdrawn as inconsistent with this analysis.”). 
130. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OPINION LETTER FLSA 2006-31, supra note 126, at 3. 
Specifically, assuming the employees earned at least $455 per week and thus fulfilled 
the salary prong of the test, the Opinion Letter evaluated whether mortgage loan of­
ficers first performed “[w]ork that is ‘directly related to the management or general 
business operations’ of the employer,” and second, whether the mortgage loan officers’ 
“primary duty include[d] the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with re­
spect to matters of significance.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a) (2004)). 
131. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,146. 
132. Id.  The new regulations also made reference to case law indicating financial 
services employees who sold financial products could also qualify as exempt employees. 
See Hogan v. Allstate Ins. Co, 361 F.3d 621 (11th Cir. 2004); Reich v. John Alden Life 
Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997); Wilshin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 212 F.Supp.2d 1360 
(M.D. Ga. 2002). 
133. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OPINION LETTER FLSA 2006-31, supra note 126, at 4­
7.  Specifically, the Opinion Letter indicated their work required them to analyze a 
customer’s financial information, advise about various loan products, and determine 
whether the customer qualified for a loan.  Like the employees described in the pream­
ble to the new regulations, the mortgage loan officers also “service[d] their employer’s 
financial services business[es] by marketing, servicing, and promoting the employer’s 
financial products.” Id. at 5. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 6.  Such discretion generally “involve[d] the comparison and the evalu­
ation of possible courses of conduct, and acting or making a decision after the various 
possibilities have been considered.” Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(a) (2004)). 
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fied as exempt employees because they “evaluate[d] . . . products, 
options, and variables . . . to determine which mortgage products 
might serve customer’s needs.”136 
The 2010 Administrator’s Interpretation analyzed mortgage 
loan officers differently.  In finding such workers did not qualify as 
administrative employees, the AI also addressed the typical job du­
ties of mortgage loan officers, referencing the regulations.137  Mort­
gage loan officers’ job duties demonstrated that they did not 
exercise discretion or independent judgment with respect to matters 
of significance, nor were they involved in running or servicing their 
employers’ businesses.138 
The AI indicated exemptions from the FLSA overtime re­
quirements “‘are to be narrowly construed against the employers 
seeking to assert them and their application limited to those estab­
lishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and 
spirit.’”139  To this end, the AI determined the job duties of mort­
gage loan officers placed them within the category of “production” 
workers.140  To reach this conclusion, the AI invoked a number of 
definitions in the regulations, emphasizing that when examined in 
total, the regulations clearly stated the production nature of a typi­
cal mortgage loan officer’s job placed the employee outside the 
scope of the administrative exemption.141 
Initially, the DOL applied the production versus administrative 
dichotomy within the regulations.  The relevant language states: 
The phrase “directly related to the management or general busi­
ness operations” refers to the type of work performed by the em­
136. Id. 
137. 29 C.F.R. § 541.2 (2004). 
138. ADMINISTRATOR’S  INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14.  According 
to the DOL, mortgage loan officers generally receive internal leads and contact custom­
ers, or field direct contacts from customers generated by the mortgage company’s mar­
keting efforts. Id.  Mortgage loan officers also collect financial information and run 
credit reports on the customers that contact the mortgage company, in order to deter­
mine whether the customers qualify for a particular loan product. Id.  After running 
the customer’s information through industry-specific software, mortgage loan officers 
determine which available loan product would best suit the customer’s individual needs. 
Id.  Finally, mortgage loan officers frequently compile customer documents and assist 
the underwriting department with finalizing loan documents for closing. Id. 
139. Id. (quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)). 
140. ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14. 
141. Robert W. Pritchard, R. Brian Dixon & Andrew J. Voss, Department of La­
bor Reverses Course: Mortgage Loan Officers Do Not Meet the Administrative Exemp­
tion’s Requirements, ASAP LITTLER MENDELSON NEWSLETTER (Mar. 2010), available 
at http://www.littler.com/files/press/pdf/2010_03_Wage_DOL_ReversesCourse_Mort-
gageLoanOfficers.pdf. 
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ployee.  To meet this requirement, an employee must perform 
work directly related to assisting with the running or servicing of 
the business, as distinguished, for example, from working on a 
manufacturing production line or selling a product in a retail or 
service establishment.142 
According to the AI, the legislative history of the FLSA illustrates 
the intention of Congress that “the administrative exemption is 
‘limited to those employees whose primary duty relates ‘to the ad­
ministrative as distinguished from the production operations of a 
business.’’”143  More specifically, the administrative exemption 
“‘relates to employees whose work involves [the] servicing [of] the 
business itself—employees who ‘can be described as staff rather 
than line employees.’’”144 
In order to determine whether mortgage loan officers’ job du­
ties were analogous to “running [or] servicing the business” or 
were, instead, more sales related, the AI looked to the regulations 
for guidance.145  Factors that indicate whether an employee’s pri­
mary job duty is sales-related, according to the regulations, are the 
employee’s job description and qualifications, sales training, com­
pensation structure (for example, commission-based), and what 
proportion of the employee’s earnings can be attributed to sales.146 
The AI referenced recent case law in support of its claim that a 
mortgage loan officer’s primary job duties were related more to 
sales than running the business.147 This indicated that “a careful 
142. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a) (2004). 
143. ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14 (quoting Fi­
nal Rule, supra note 27, at 22,141). 
144. Id. (quoting Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,141).  The AI cited case law that 
had recently relied on the “production versus administration dichotomy.” Bothell v. 
Phase Metrics, 299 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002), (quoting Bratt v. County of Los 
Angeles, 912 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 1990)) (“‘[P]roduction versus administration di­
chotomy’ is intended to distinguish ‘between work related to the goods and services 
which constitute the business’ marketplace offerings and work which contributes to run­
ning the business itself.”); Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 587 F.3d 529, 535 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(“[W]e have drawn an important distinction between employees directly producing the 
good or service that is the primary output of a business and employees performing 
general administrative work applicable to the running of any business.”). 
145. Pritchard, Dixon, & Voss, supra note 141, at 2. 
146. 29 C.F.R. § 541.504(b) (2004). 
147. Pritchard, Dixon, & Voss, supra note 141, at 2. See Martin v. Cooper Elec­
tric Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 905 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992) (“Any 
[job] duties undertaken . . . in the course of ordinary selling do not constitute adminis­
trative-type ‘servicing’ of Cooper’s wholesale business . . . . These activities are only 
routine aspects of sales production.”); Casas v. Conseco, No. Civ.00–1512 (JRT/SRN), 
2002 WL 507059, at *9 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2002) (Mortgage loan officers were “produc­
tion rather than administrative employees”). 
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examination of the law as applied to the mortgage loan officers’ 
duties demonstrate[d] that their primary duty [was] making sales 
and, therefore, mortgage loan officers perform[ed] the production 
work of their employers.”148 
Clearly, the DOL interprets the regulations to indicate that a 
primary duty of making sales is mutually exclusive to a primary 
duty “directly related to the management or general business oper­
ations of their employer or their employer’s customers.”149  Be­
cause mortgage loan officers have the primary duty of selling loan 
products of their employers, they do not qualify for an administra­
tive exemption, according to the AI.150  The DOL was so certain 
about the exempt status of this particular type of salesperson, it cre­
ated a new category of guidance document to remedy its previous 
mistake. 
B.	 The Secretary of Labor’s Amicus Brief in Support of the 
Plaintiffs in In re Novartis Wage and Hour Litigation 
Further indicating the DOL’s position on administrative em­
ployees, the Secretary of Labor filed an amicus brief on behalf of 
the plaintiff pharmaceutical sales representatives in the 2010 Sec­
ond Circuit Appeals Court case, In re Novartis Wage and Hour Liti­
gation.151  The brief indicated that determining the sales 
representatives in question qualified for the administrative exemp­
tion ran contrary to “the regulatory requirement that employees 
must exercise discretion and independent judgment with respect to 
148. ADMINISTRATOR’S  INTERPRETATION  NO. 2010-1, supra note 14. The cases 
indicated that in analyzing the financial qualifications of a particular customer, “loan 
officers [were] performing ‘screening for the benefit of the employer, rather than servic­
ing for the benefit of the customer.’” Id. at 5 (quoting Pontius v. Delta Financial Corp., 
No. 04-1737, 2007 WL 1496692, at *9 & n.20 (D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2007)).  Additionally, 
mortgage loan officers were historically paid on commission, based on the number of 
sales made or loans closed by a particular loan officer, another factor demonstrating 
sales was their primary duty. Pritchard, Dixon & Voss, supra note 141, at 3.  Mortgage 
loan officers were also trained in sales techniques, and evaluated on the basis of the 
number of loans they closed, further indicating the job duties of a mortgage loan officer 
were sales-related. Id. 
149.	 ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14. 
150.	 Id. 
151. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011).  The Secretary of Labor is charged with “administer[ing] and 
enforce[ing] the FLSA . . . and [therefore] has a compelling interest in ensuring that it is 
interpreted correctly.”  Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 1 (citation omitted). See also 29 
U.S.C. §§ 204(a), (b), 211(a) (2006).  For a discussion of deference to the DOL’s inter­
pretation of its own regulations, see infra Part IV.C. See also discussion of the Novartis 
case, supra Part II.A. 
31827-w
ne_34-1 S
heet N
o. 118 S
ide A
      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 118 Side A      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-1\WNE106.txt unknown Seq: 23  9-MAY-12 12:37
R
R
R
227 2012] SALESPEOPLE AND FLSA EXEMPTIONS 
matters of significance in order to qualify for the administrative 
exemption.”152 
The DOL amicus brief detailed the primary job duties of a 
pharmaceutical sales representative.  Arguing that although Novar­
tis representatives exercise some discretion in carrying out their pri­
mary job duties, the Secretary of Labor indicated the level of 
discretion exercised was not sufficient to bring them within the 
boundaries of the administrative exemption.153  Novartis did not 
meet its burden of proving its sales representatives exercised discre­
tion and independent judgment sufficient to qualify them for the 
exemption.154  The applicable section of the regulations defines the 
type of discretion that would qualify an employee for the exemp­
tion.155  Some of the examples point to whether the employee has 
authority to deviate from established procedures without prior ap­
proval, whether the employee has authority to negotiate and bind 
the company on significant matters, and whether the employee pro­
vides consultation or expert advice to management.156  The Pream­
ble to the Final Rule indicated that employees who met at least two 
or three of the examples listed would be considered to have exer­
cised discretion and independent judgment.157 
Exemptions to the FLSA are intended “to be narrowly con­
strued against the employers seeking to assert them.”158  The Secre­
tary of Labor, in Novartis, argued that the job duties of the Novartis 
pharmaceutical sales representatives did not comport with the ex­
amples listed in the regulations and, therefore, Novartis representa­
tives could not be considered to have exercised discretion and 
independent judgment.159  Because Novartis representatives did not 
meet the third prong of the regulatory test for administrative em­
ployees, the Secretary of Labor argued they did not qualify for the 
exemption.160 
152. Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 2. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(3) (2004). See 
also discussion of the Novartis case, supra Part II.A. 
153. Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 2. 
154. Id. at 10. 
155. Id. at 10 n.6. 
156. Id. at 18 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(b) (2004)). 
157. Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 11. 
158. Id. at 7. 
159. Id. at 21. 
160. Id. at 9-15. 
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IV. TODAY’S SALESPERSON IS  YESTERDAY’S STRAW BOSS;
 
APPLYING THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT TO
 
THE MODERN WORKPLACE
 
The disparity among the courts as to whether to classify sales­
people as administrative employees illustrates the need for a 
streamlined system of legal analysis; one that promotes efficiency 
and fairness in administering FLSA overtime claims. The produc­
tion/administration dichotomy is a useful tool in understanding how 
to classify salespeople.  Construing the exemptions to the FLSA 
narrowly, it becomes clear that the category of production employ­
ees includes salespeople; sales personnel, then, cannot be exempted 
from the FLSA’s overtime protections.  Furthermore, the DOL has 
been clear that sales personnel are within the category of workers 
entitled to overtime.  Deferring to the DOL, as is appropriate in 
these circumstances, would result in courts finding that salespeople 
must be paid overtime pursuant to the FLSA. 
A.	 Reviewing Courts Should Apply the Production/ 
Administration Dichotomy 
The administrative exemption was always intended to apply 
only to those employees whose job duties relate to running a busi­
ness.161  From the original promulgation of the FLSA, the DOL has 
indicated a clear distinction between “production” and “administra­
tion” work,162 the goal being that “only those employees involved 
in the business of business qualified [for the exemption].”163 
The preamble to the 2004 amended regulations described the 
production/administration dichotomy as follows: 
The Department believes that the dichotomy is still a relevant 
and useful tool in appropriate cases to identify employees who 
should be excluded from the exemption.  As the Department 
[has] recognized . . . , this exemption is intended to be limited to 
those employees whose duties relate “to the administrative as 
distinguished from the ‘production’ operations of a business.” 
161. Snider and Associates, LLC, Administrative/Production Dichotomy–DOL 
Revisions to FLSA Regs, http://www.sniderlaw.com/articles/Administrative_Production 
_Dichotomy_FLSA_and_DOL.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
162.	 Id. 
163. Id. (emphasis added); see also Bothell v. Phase Metrics, Inc., 299 F.3d 1120, 
1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[The dichotomy distinguishes] between work related to the goods 
and services which constitute the business’ marketplace offerings and work which con­
tributes to running the business itself.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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Thus, it relates to employees whose work involves servicing the 
business itself—employees who “can be described as staff rather 
than line employees, or as functional rather than departmental 
heads.” . . . .  Based on these principles, the Department provided 
in proposed section 541.201(a) that the administrative exemption 
covers only employees performing a particular type of work— 
work related to assisting with the running or servicing of the 
business.164 
When the FLSA was promulgated originally, the regulations re­
ferred to production jobs such as “key punch operators, legmen, 
straw bosses and gang leaders,” which no longer exist in the modern 
workplace.165  To be sure, the Preamble to the 2004 regulations in­
dicates that the purpose of the change to the regulations was “to 
restore the overtime protections intended by the FLSA,” which had 
become “severely eroded,” principally because the DOL has failed 
to update the regulations and properly define the exceptions166 
Such language illustrates the DOL’s intention to apply the regula­
tions broadly, so as to provide overtime benefits to a greater num­
ber of workers who had, according to the DOL, lost the protections 
of the FLSA over time.167 
Significantly, the current regulations retain the distinction be­
tween production and administrative employees.168  Discussed 
within the context of the second prong of the regulatory test for 
administrative employees, the regulations emphasize the dichotomy 
as follows: 
To meet th[e] requirement [of performing work directly related 
to the management or general business operations], an employee 
must perform work directly related to assisting with the running 
or servicing of the business, as distinguished, for example, from 
working on a manufacturing production line or selling a product 
in a retail or service establishment.169 
In the most general sense, a worker who assists with production 
within a business is outside the boundaries of the administrative ex­
emption, while an employee who is involved with running the busi­
164. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,141. 
165. Id. at 22122; see also supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (discussing 
the shift in the American economy to a more service-oriented employment base). 
166. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,122.  Although the preamble also discussed 
the other white-collar exemptions, references to the other exemptions have been elimi­
nated as a discussion of the other exemptions is outside the scope of this Note. 
167. Id. 
168. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a) (2004). 
169. Id. (emphasis added). 
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ness in some way is not entitled to overtime compensation. These 
examples from the legislative history of the FLSA illustrate why 
reviewing courts should apply the production/administration di­
chotomy in order to determine whether employees qualify for the 
administrative exemption. 
Some courts have applied the production/administration dis­
tinction.  The Second Circuit, for example, held in Davis v. J.P. 
Morgan Chase,170 that according to the second prong of the regula­
tory test, the plaintiff employees performed work that qualified as 
either administrative or “production/sales,” but not both.171  The 
Davis court, relying on Reich v. State of New York,172 construed 
“production” broadly173 and held that the reasoning in the Reich 
case, regarding the production/administration dichotomy, applied 
to the facts of the current case. The court indicated that a “literal 
reading of ‘production’ to require tangible goods ha[d] no basis in 
law or regulation.”174 
The Second Circuit again applied the production/administra­
tion dichotomy in Reiseck v. Universal Communications of Miami, 
Inc., in evaluating whether an advertising saleswoman was entitled 
to overtime pay.175  Initially, as it had done in the Davis case, the 
Second Circuit interpreted “production” broadly, holding that the 
advertising space the plaintiff sold was the “product” of the defen­
170. Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 587 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 2009). 
171. Id. at 532.  The primary job duty of the plaintiff underwriters in the Davis 
case was to sell the bank’s loan products. Id. at 534.  As such, the court held the plain­
tiffs’ contribution to the company did not involve management decisions or decisions 
regarding the general business operations of the company, such as the human resource 
or advertising worker hypothesized in the regulations. Id. (referencing the pre-amend­
ment regulations); see 29 C.F.R. § 541.2 (2002).  Instead, the Plaintiffs’ work concerned 
the “‘production’ of loans–the fundamental service provided by the bank.” Id. at 534. 
172. Reich v. State of New York, 3 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 
1163 (1994) (regarding the exempt status of state police investigators). 
173. Davis, 587 F.3d at 532.  In Reich, the Second Circuit considered the criminal 
investigations conducted a “product” and held that state police investigators did not 
qualify for the administrative exemption because ‘“the primary function of the Investi­
gators . . . [was] to conduct–or ‘produce’-its criminal investigations,’ the . . . Investiga­
tors fell ‘squarely on the production side of the line’” and were therefore found to be 
entitled to overtime pay. Id. at 532 (quoting Reich, 3 F.3d at 587-88).  Further clarify­
ing, the court indicated intangible goods, such as criminal investigations and the loans 
that were the subject of the current case, were to be considered “products” pursuant to 
the FLSA. Id. at 532-33. 
174. Id. at 532. 
175. Reiseck v. Universal Commc’ns of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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231 2012] SALESPEOPLE AND FLSA EXEMPTIONS 
dant employer.176  As a sales employee, Reiseck did not qualify for 
the administrative exemption.177 
To reach this conclusion, the court referenced the section of 
the amended regulations addressing financial sector workers.178 
Again applying a broad interpretation of “production” to intangible 
products, the court analogized the plaintiff’s sale of advertising 
space to the sale of financial products considered in the regula­
tions.179  Through application of the production/administration di­
chotomy, the Second Circuit again reached the conclusion that a 
plaintiff salesperson was not an administrative employee under the 
FLSA.180 
Certainly, an argument can be made that the production/ad­
ministration dichotomy does not automatically indicate the exempt 
status of an employee.181  Indeed, some reviewing courts have de­
clined to apply the dichotomy, finding it inapplicable in certain con­
texts.182  In fact, the Preamble to the 2004 regulations emphasized 
that the “dichotomy has always been illustrative—but not disposi­
tive—of exempt status . . . .”183  The dichotomy should be used as 
176. Id. at 106 (considering “sales” and “production” work interchangeably). 
177. Id. at 107 (relying on the description of the plaintiff’s job duties in the re­
cord, the court held Reiseck should be considered a sales employee). 
178. Id. at 107-08.  Specifically, the regulations made the distinction between a 
financial sector worker whose primary duty is to “‘market[ ], service[ ], or promote[ ] 
the employer’s financial products,’ . . . [and] ‘an employee whose primary duty is selling 
financial products.’” Id. (referencing 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b) (2004)) (emphasis added 
by the court).  The former would qualify for the administrative exemption, while the 
latter would not. Id. at 108. 
179. Id. at 107.  “Universal’s sale of advertising space is similar to a financial ser­
vices company’s sale of financial products.  Neither fits neatly within the traditional 
retail sales model, yet both are standard products sold directly to the clients.” Id. at 
108. 
180. Id. at 108.  The court adopted the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the regu­
lations in the Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992).  In Martin, the court interpreted the phrase “promoting 
sales” to mean increasing sales generally, rather than selling directly to customers. 
Martin, 940 F.2d at 905. 
181. See, e.g., Pritchard, Dixon, & Voss, supra note 141 (referencing the language 
in the Preamble to the 2004 regulations specifying the dichotomy has “always been 
illustrative-but not dispositive-of exempt status”). Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,141. 
182. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. Civ. 02–6205–TC, 
2004 WL 1857112, at * 13-14 (D. Or. Aug. 18, 2004) (claiming Final Rule had moved 
away from the dichotomy in the service industry context); Heffelfinger v. Elec. Data 
Sys. Corp., 580 F.Supp.2d 933, 956 (D. Cal. 2008) (administrative/production “dichot­
omy is often of limited use outside of the manufacturing context in which it was de­
vised”); Roe-Midgett v. CC Servs., Inc., 512 F.3d 865, 870 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that 
dichotomy no longer applies in the modern service industry context). 
183. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,141. 
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232 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:205 
“one piece of the larger inquiry,” and provide a definitive answer 
regarding whether an employee qualifies for the administrative ex­
emption “only when work falls squarely on the production side of 
the line.”184 
However, it is important to note the DOL indicated the dichot­
omy should be illustrative.  A genuine need for a distinguishing test 
arises in the case of sales personnel who, as the division among the 
courts indicates, have some job duties that arguably place them in 
both camps.  Certainly, a salesperson’s duties involving the general 
operations of his or her employer’s business might well indicate he 
or she should be considered an administrative employee.185  But in 
this regard, while not dispositive, the production/administration di­
chotomy can be used as a baseline determination of the salesper­
son’s exempt status.186  From this starting point, the primary duties 
of the salesperson should be measured against the regulatory re­
quirements, where it will be shown that the employee does not 
qualify for the exemption.187  Since salespeople are “producing” the 
products of their respective employers, they will not be found to be 
exercising discretion and independent judgment, and it will be clear 
they do not qualify for the exemption.188 
A strong policy argument can be made for using the produc­
tion/administration dichotomy when analyzing the exempt adminis­
trative status of salespeople.  As indicated in the Davis case, the 
fundamental purpose of the overtime requirements was both quan­
titative and qualitative.  The overtime requirements were intended 
to increase the quantity of available jobs by pressuring employers to 
spread employment across a greater number of workers in order to 
avoid paying the higher wage.189  Additionally, the requirements 
were intended to raise the quality of the work performed, by com­
pensating workers at a higher rate for the “burden of a workweek 
beyond the hours fixed in the Act.”190 
184. See, e.g., Pritchard, Dixon, & Voss, supra note 141, at 2 (citing Final Rule, 
supra note 27, at 22,141) (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted). 
185. Snider and Associates, LLC, supra note 161, at 2. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 587 F.3d 529, 535 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing 
Overnight Motor Transp. Co., Inc. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 577-78 (1942), superseded by 
statute, Portal-to-Pay Act of 1947, ch. 52 § 1, 61 Stat. 84 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. § 251 (2006)). 
190. Id. 
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233 2012] SALESPEOPLE AND FLSA EXEMPTIONS 
The policy behind the overtime requirements is particularly 
relevant today.  The FLSA was promulgated in the Depression era 
as New Deal legislation.191  Our country is now faced with many of 
the same challenges faced by Americans in 1938.  More than two 
years after the official end of the worst economic downturn since 
the Great Depression, unemployment continues to hover at signifi­
cantly high rates.192  In light of the current economic conditions, the 
protections of the FLSA are as relevant now as they were when the 
Act was first promulgated. 
Applying the production/administration dichotomy is a means 
to achieve the end result of the policy behind the FLSA. The Davis 
court indicates that although any type of job can be spread among 
several workers, work can more readily be spread among produc­
tion employees than among those classified as administrative.193 
There is a “direct correlation between hours worked and materials 
produced in the case of . . . production workers, [a measurement 
that] does not exist [with] administrative employees.”194  As such, 
considering any worker paid on a production basis, for example 
salespeople compensated by commission on the basis of their sales 
or production, would broaden the application of the FLSA to a 
greater number of employees.  Applying the FLSA to a greater 
number of employees fulfills the original work-spreading mission of 
the FLSA,195 and comports with the aim of the 2004 regulations to 
restore overtime provisions to workers who lost the protections of 
the FLSA over time.196 
The production/administration dichotomy is an essential tool in 
analyzing whether a salesperson qualifies as an exempt administra­
tive employee.  Current conditions in our national economy in par­
191. Cunningham, supra note 4, at 1245-46; see supra note 21 and accompanying 
text. 
192. See World Bank: Economy worst since Depression, CNNMONEY.COM (Mar. 
9, 2009, 7:04 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/09/news/international/global_econ­
omy_world_bank/. (regarding the status of the current economic downturn); see 
Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, Unemployment Rate, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last vis­
ited Apr. 15, 2012) (demonstrating the unemployment rate from 2002 to the present). 
The chart on the website indicates the unemployment rate during the recession was 
highest in October, 2009 at 10%. Id.  The rate reported in March, 2012 remained high, 
reducing only slightly to 8.2%. Id.  At the start of the recession in January, 2008, the 
unemployment rate was 5%. Id. 
193. Davis, 587 F.3d at 535. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,123. 
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234 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:205 
ticular make application of the production/administration 
dichotomy sound policy when analyzing the status of salespeople. 
B.	 Exemptions to the FLSA Overtime Requirements Should Be 
Narrowly Construed 
Since the Supreme Court decided Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, 
Inc. in 1960,197 courts have held that exemptions to remedial em­
ployment statutes must be construed narrowly against employers 
seeking to assert them, and should be “‘limited to those establish­
ments plainly and unmistakably within [the exemption’s] terms and 
spirit.’”198  However, in examining case law interpreting the admin­
istrative employee exemption to the FLSA, it is clear that courts 
have applied these principles differently. 
The Second Circuit has correctly followed the intentions of the 
Arnold court.  Construing the administrative exemption to the 
FLSA narrowly would require courts to include a wide variety of 
job designations among those qualifying for overtime wages.  Par­
ticularly because the nature of jobs available to the American 
worker has changed so dramatically from the time the FLSA was 
promulgated, courts must examine a litigant’s job with the “terms 
and spirit”199 of the FLSA in mind, as applying the FLSA literally 
to the modern job market is no longer possible.200  This Note argues 
that the Second Circuit has properly interpreted the FLSA as ap­
plying to a broader category of modern jobs. This broad applica­
tion succeeds in narrowly construing the exemptions to the FLSA, 
as well as limiting the Act’s exemptions to those jobs “plainly and 
unmistakably within [the exemption’s] terms and spirit.”201 
1.	 The Second Circuit 
In Reiseck v. Universal Communications of Miami, the Second 
Circuit acknowledged that a magazine publisher was not the proto­
typical business originally contemplated by the FLSA, as it was 
197.	 Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388 (1960). 
198. Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting 
Arnold, 361 U.S. at 392). 
199. Arnold, 361 U.S. at 392.  For a discussion regarding the changing nature of 
jobs available to the American worker, see supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
200. Tilson & Glenn, supra note 39, at 171. See also supra notes 42-49 and ac­
companying text (discussing background of how the job market has changed since the 
original promulgation of FLSA). 
201.	 Arnold, 361 U.S. at 392. 
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235 2012] SALESPEOPLE AND FLSA EXEMPTIONS 
neither a manufacturer nor a retailer.202  Designating whether the 
plaintiff’s work qualified as exempt pursuant to the FLSA was 
therefore more difficult.203 
The Reiseck court interpreted the regulations broadly in favor 
of employees by determining that Reiseck’s primary job duties 
placed her outside the administrative exemption.204  As discussed, 
the Reiseck court defined advertising space as a “product” of the 
magazine.205  If magazine space was a product, and Reiseck’s pri­
mary job duty was to sell that product, her job duties placed her on 
the production rather than the administration side of the company. 
According to the regulations, performing production work indi­
cated that an employee’s primary job duty was not “‘directly re­
lated to management policies or general business operations of 
[the] employer,’”206 and therefore was outside the boundaries of 
the administrative exemption.207 
Universal’s sale of advertising space is similar to a financial ser­
vices employee’s sale of financial products.208  “Neither fits neatly 
[into] the traditional retail sales model” within the original FLSA, 
yet both are considered products sold directly to clients.209  The 
Reiseck court’s broad application of the production/administration 
dichotomy and broad analogy to the financial services employees 
202. Reiseck v. Universal Commc’ns of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 
2010). See discussion supra Part II.A. 
203. Reiseck, 591 F.3d at 106. 
204. Id. at 107.  The court conceded Reiseck performed duties other than actual 
sales during the course of her employ. Id.  However, the court relied on the definition 
within the regulations that “an employee’s ‘primary duty’ is the duty that consumes a 
‘major part, or over [fifty] percent, of the employee’s time.’” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. 
§ 541.103 (2004)) (“[D]efining ‘primary duty’ for the executive employee.”). The court 
also referred to 29 C.F.R. § 541.206, which “appli[es] the definition of  ‘primary duty’ 
for the executive employee to the administrative employee.” Reiseck 591 F.3d at 107 
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.206 (2004)). 
205. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
206. Reiseck, 591 F.3d at 105 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.2(a) (2004)). 
207. Id. at 107.  Although this case evaluated the plaintiff’s exempt status by ap­
plying the pre-2004 regulations, the court indicated the new regulations were entitled to 
some deference if the reviewing court deemed them persuasive. Id. at 105-08 (citing 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
208. Id. at 108.  The court analogized the discussion of financial sector employees 
within the 2004 regulations in determining the sale, or production, of the company’s 
advertising space placed Ms. Reiseck outside the administrative exemption. Id.  Like 
the financial sector employee who sold her employer’s financial products directly, in 
selling her employer’s product of advertising space, Ms. Reiseck also fell outside of the 
boundaries of the administrative exemption. Id. 
209. Id. 
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236 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:205 
discussed within the regulations are examples of the Second Circuit 
construing the exemptions narrowly against employers. 
In holding the plaintiff class of pharmaceutical sales represent­
atives did not qualify for the administrative exemption, the Second 
Circuit also construed the exemptions narrowly in In re Novartis 
Wage and Hour Litigation.210  The Novartis court focused on the 
third prong of the regulatory test, whether the employees “exer­
cise[d] discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters 
of significance.”211  Although the court conceded that the sales rep­
resentatives’ job duties permitted some discretion and independent 
judgment, the court held the sales representatives did not exercise 
enough discretion and independent judgment to elevate them to the 
status of an exempt employee.212  Such an interpretation of the job 
duties of the plaintiff sales representatives indicates the Novartis 
court construed the exemptions narrowly against the employer. 
The Second Circuit also construed the exemptions to the FLSA 
narrowly in Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase.213  The court determined 
that the plaintiffs had a primary job duty of selling loans for their 
bank employer.  As discussed, the Second Circuit also applied the 
production/administration dichotomy in evaluating the exempt sta­
tus of the loan officers.  As it had done in the Reiseck decision, the 
court reasoned that because the plaintiffs’ primary duty was to sell 
loan products, their work was unrelated to either setting manage­
ment policies of the bank or to its general business operations, and 
instead concerned the “production” of loans.214  As such, the loan 
officers did not meet the second prong of the regulatory test, that 
their “work [be] directly related to management policies or general 
210. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 157 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011); see Leffler, supra note 77 (“Rejecting a broad reading of 
the FLSA’s exemptions, the Second Circuit relied upon the [ ] DOL’s narrow interpre­
tation of the regulations . . . .”). The Novartis court relied heavily on the amicus brief 
filed on behalf of the plaintiffs by the DOL. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
211. Novartis, 611 F.3d at 149.  The sales representatives had the freedom to de­
cide in what order to call on physicians, how to best use the budget they were given for 
sales presentations, and how to designate the use of the free samples they were given 
for distribution. Id. at 157.  Additionally, sales representatives tailored their presenta­
tions to best suit the particular physician audience, and selected which speakers would 
be most appropriate to present to doctors reluctant to accept individual sales calls. Id. 
at 145-46. 
212. Id. at 144-46. 
213. Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 587 F.3d 529, 535 (2d Cir. 2009). 
214. Id. at 534.  The Second Circuit decided the Davis case a few weeks before 
hearing arguments on the Reiseck case. See id. at 537. 
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237 2012] SALESPEOPLE AND FLSA EXEMPTIONS 
business operations . . . .”215  Thus, they did not qualify for the ad­
ministrative exemption.  In viewing the job duties of the loan of­
ficers in this way, the Second Circuit again construed the 
exemptions narrowly against the bank employer. 
Construing the exemptions to the FLSA narrowly creates a 
presumption against the exemption.  To rebut the presumption, an 
employer seeking to apply the exemption has the burden to prove 
an employee qualifies for the exemption.216  Courts in the Second 
Circuit have ruled on the exempt status of the employees in ques­
tion as though they were presumed not to be exempt.  As such, the 
Second Circuit has construed the exemptions to the FLSA 
narrowly. 
2. The Majority Rule 
The majority of courts ruling on whether sales personnel qual­
ify as exempt administrative employees has not followed the direc­
tive of Arnold, which requires exemptions to the FLSA to be 
narrowly construed against employers.217  The First Circuit, for ex­
ample, has fallen short of Arnold’s mandate.  In Cash v. Cycle Craft 
Co., Inc.,218 the court addressed whether a salesperson qualified for 
the administrative exemption in a setting that had been directly ad­
dressed in the regulations, a retail store.219 
In holding that the plaintiff was an administrative employee, 
the First Circuit relied on the reasoning from Reich v. John Alden 
Life Ins. Co., where the court held that the life insurance company’s 
marketing representatives were administrative employees.220  Simi­
larly, the Cash court held that Cash’s job duties placed him within 
the boundaries of the administrative exemption.221  The First Cir­
215. Id. at 537.  The court indicated that a “literal reading of ‘production,’” lim­
ited only to “tangible goods has no basis in law or regulation.” Id. at 532. 
216. Novartis, 611 F.3d at 150 (“The burden of proving that employees fall within 
such an exemption is on the employer.”). 
217. See, e.g., Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2010); Dar­
veau v. Detecon 515 F.3d 334, 339 (4th Cir. 2008); Cash v. Cycle Craft Company, Inc., 
508 F.3d 680, 686 (1st Cir. 2007). 
218. Cash v. Cycle Craft Company, Inc., 508 F.3d 680, 684 (1st Cir. 2007). 
219. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a) (2004).  The regulation states that in order for work 
to be considered as directly related to the management or general business operations 
of the employer, it must be “directly related to assisting with the running or servicing of 
the business, as distinguished, for example, from working on a manufacturing produc­
tion line or selling a product in a retail or service establishment.” Id. (emphasis added). 
220. Cash, 508 F.3d at 685. 
221. Id. at 686.  The plaintiff was hired as a New Purchase/Customer Service 
Manager, whose job duties included working with various departments within the com­
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238 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:205 
cuit held that Cash qualified for the administrative exemption be­
cause he “did not simply produce a product; he exercised 
independent judgment as he engaged in the company’s business 
operations.”222 
Such a literal and limited interpretation of the regulations does 
not comport with the command that the exemptions be construed 
narrowly.223  Arnold’s holding, that the exemptions apply “‘to 
those establishments plainly and unmistakably within [the exemp­
tions’] terms and spirit,’”224 indicates that the Supreme Court inter­
preted the regulations to require that any business fitting within the 
“spirit” of the FLSA should have its exemptions narrowly 
construed. 
As a retail establishment, the business at issue in this case is 
exactly the type of establishment that should fall outside of the ex­
emption.225  A narrow application of the exemption would likely 
result in finding that the work performed by Cash was incidental to 
sales, and therefore qualifying as direct sales or production work. 
The regulations indicate that “[p]romotional work [which] is actu­
ally performed incidental to and in conjunction with an employee’s 
own outside sales or solicitations is exempt work[, while] promo­
tional work that is incidental to sales made, or to be made, by some­
one else is not exempt outside sales work.”226 
While the marketing representatives in the John Alden case 
worked with agents outside of their company to make sales, Cash 
pany to ensure customers received their motorcyles outfitted as they had ordered, and 
liaison between customers and the company to ensure the motorcycle was delivered and 
the customer was satisfied with the purchase. Id. at 682.  Cash was ‘“engaged in some­
thing more than routine selling efforts focused simply on particular sales transactions.’” 
Id. at 685 (quoting Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1, 10 (1997).  Also, 
because “Cash exercised discretion in reacting to the unique needs of [the company’s] 
customers, . . . [he was] ‘not merely [a] ‘skilled’ worker[ ] who operate[d] within a strict 
set of rules.’” Id. at 686 (quoting Reich, 126 F.3d at 14). 
222. Id. 
223. Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960); see Cash, 508 F.3d 
at 683. 
224. Arnold, 361 U.S. at 392. 
225. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a) (2004) (addressing retail establishments). 
226. 29 C.F.R. § 541.503(a) (2004).  Although this section of the regulations ad­
dresses the outside sales exemption rather than the administrative exemption, other 
sections of the regulations apply a definition within one exemption to another of the 
exemptions. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.103 (2004); 29 C.F.R. § 541.206 (2004). For example, 
§ 541.103 defines “primary duty” for the executive employee, while § 541.206 applies 
the definition of “primary duty” for the executive employee to the administrative em­
ployee. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 541.103.  Such a practice is an indication the different sections 
of the regulations are intended to apply to each other. 
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239 2012] SALESPEOPLE AND FLSA EXEMPTIONS 
worked with other employees within the same business to do the 
same.227  His role can be interpreted as another step in the line of 
producing or selling the product of the company, the Harley David-
son motorcycle.  In other words, he helped “produce” the 
motorcycles, as his role was to ensure customers received what they 
ordered, and were satisfied with their purchases.  He was not in­
volved with management decisions, or with running the business. 
As a production worker, he is the prototypical employee intended 
to be protected by the FLSA,228 and therefore, outside the bounda­
ries of its exemptions. 
The Third Circuit, like the First Circuit, has failed to follow 
Arnold’s mandate.  In Smith v. Johnson & Johnson,229 the court 
held that the plaintiff was exempted from the overtime require­
ments of the FLSA as an administrative employee.230  However, the 
Third Circuit’s application of the principle enunciated in the Arnold 
case falls short.231  In holding that Smith performed duties directly 
related to the general business operations of the company, the court 
referred only to the strategic plan Smith developed.232  To be sure, 
Smith had no involvement in determining the overall business strat­
egy of Johnson & Johnson.  The court disregarded the strict param­
eters within which the plaintiff was expected to perform her job.233 
Although Smith executed her job without oversight, she was told 
what to do and say when calling upon referring physicians.234  In 
these ways, Smith’s job was analogous to the “line worker,” or pro­
duction worker, contemplated by the original iteration of the 
FLSA.235  The Smith case indicates that the Third Circuit has not 
held the defendant employer to its burden of proving the plaintiff 
227. Cash, 508 F.3d at 685. 
228. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a). 
229. Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2010). 
230. Id. at 285.  In so deciding, the court referred to several aspects of her job. 
Id. at 282.  Although her employer, Johnson & Johnson, gave Smith a list of how many 
physicians to call on each day, she decided which doctors to see and when. Id.  While 
Smith was given a budget, she had control over how to spend the money she was allo­
cated. Id.  The court also relied on the testimony of the plaintiff, in which she indicated 
that she had freedom and responsibility in her job because she was unsupervised most 
of the time. Id.  In her deposition, Smith also claimed she ran her territory in the man­
ner she wanted. Id. at 282-83. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
231. See Smith, 593 F.3d at 284. 
232. Id. at 285. 
233. Id. at 282.  For example, the plaintiff was given a list of specific doctors to 
target, a prepared “message” to convey to the physicians, and was provided with visual 
aids to use during sales meetings. Id. 
234. Id. 
235. See, e.g., Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,142. 
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240 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:205 
fell within the exemption, and has not succeeded in construing the 
exemption narrowly. 
The failure of the Third Circuit to construe the exemption nar­
rowly raises an important issue regarding the application of the reg­
ulatory test.  The court conceded that applying the test as they have 
could prompt different results based on slightly different facts.236  A 
test so susceptible to different interpretations is fundamentally un­
fair.  The court itself indicated that such a test could lead to a cir­
cumstance where two representatives employed by the same 
company might find themselves in a situation where one received 
overtime benefits and one did not.237  Such an imbalance is a fur­
ther indication that courts should follow the Second Circuit’s lead 
in construing the exemptions to the FLSA narrowly. 
While the Second Circuit has construed the exemptions nar­
rowly, the majority of reviewing courts, in holding generally that 
salespeople are exempt administrative employees, have not done 
so.  When a salesperson’s job duties have aspects of exempt and 
nonexempt work, as is often true, case law dictates the exemptions 
to the regulations are to be construed narrowly and the employer’s 
burden in exempting an employee from overtime pay is high.  Such 
a high burden of proof indicates sales personnel are more likely 
than not to fall outside the administrative exemption, as selling is 
considered “production” in the production/administration dichot­
omy.  Through their literal and limited application of the regula­
tions, courts in the majority have set up a circumstance where the 
regulations apply differently to employees with identical job duties, 
and apply exemptions to jobs the FLSA clearly intended to protect. 
Permitting such an outcome flies in the face of the purpose of con­
struing the exemptions narrowly, and of the FLSA overall. 
C. The DOL is Entitled to Deference 
The DOL has spoken on a number of occasions regarding the 
exempt status of sales personnel.238  This Note argues that because 
the DOL is entitled to deference in interpreting the FLSA and its 
own regulations, reviewing courts should follow the lead of the 
236. Smith, 593 F.3d at 283 n.1 (“[W]e recognize that based on different facts, 
courts, including this Court, considering similar issues involving sales representatives 
for other pharmaceutical companies, or perhaps even for J & J, might reach a different 
result than that we reach here.”). 
237. Id. 
238. See supra Part III (regarding the DOL’s interpretation of the exempt status 
of salespeople in recent years). 
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241 2012] SALESPEOPLE AND FLSA EXEMPTIONS 
DOL, as the Second Circuit has done, thereby holding that, as a 
general rule, salespeople do not qualify for the administrative 
exemption. 
1. The 2004 Amendments: The “Final Rule” 
Pursuant to the express language of the statute, the Secretary 
of Labor has the delegated power to administer and enforce the 
FLSA.239  After undergoing the requisite notice and comment pro­
cedure, the DOL promulgated amended regulations defining and 
delimiting the overtime exemptions to the FLSA.240  When the lan­
guage of a statute is ambiguous, reviewing courts are required to 
give controlling deference to an agency’s interpretation of the stat­
ute unless the interpretation is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or 
contrary to the statute.241 
The FLSA does not unambiguously define the parameters of 
the white-collar exemptions.  The statute merely exempts “any em­
ployee employed in a bona fide . . . administrative capacity . . .”242 
without indicating which workers qualify as administrative employ­
ees.  Because the statute is ambiguous, the agency regulations must 
define what is meant by an “administrative employee.”  In fact, the 
statute gives the Secretary of Labor a clear directive to “define[ ] 
and delimit[ ] [administrative employees] from time to time by reg­
ulations.”243  In the 2004 Final Rule, the DOL outlined the appro­
priate method to determine whether an employee is exempt from 
the Act’s overtime provisions.244  The DOL’s official position re­
garding how the FLSA is to be interpreted is entitled to controlling 
deference, and therefore has the force of law.245 
239. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 204(a)-(b), 211(a), 216(c), 217 (2006). 
240. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,122; see supra notes 51-66 and accompanying 
text. 
241. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 
(1984). 
[T]he court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as 
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.  Rather, 
if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the ques­
tion for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute. 
Id. at 843; see also Long Island Care at Home, Ltd v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 165-68, 171-75 
(2007); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 
(2005); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001). 
242. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (2006). 
243. Id. 
244. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a) (2004). 
245. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44. 
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242 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:205 
The FLSA was established as a remedial statute, and, there­
fore, must be interpreted broadly in favor of protecting the right of 
employees to receive overtime pay.246  As indicated, the Final Rule 
construes the statute broadly by including a wide array of workers 
in the category of those entitled to overtime compensation.247  At 
the same time, the Final Rule illustrates the DOL’s conscious deci­
sion to retain the production/administration dichotomy in the 
amended regulations.248  Because the DOL is entitled to controlling 
deference regarding its interpretation of the FLSA, reviewing 
courts have been charged with the duty of both construing the Act 
broadly and applying the production/administration dichotomy in 
evaluating the status of employees as administrative. 
The Second Circuit has succeeded in giving due deference to 
the DOL’s position.  Recent case law indicates that the Second Cir­
cuit has both construed the FLSA broadly in favor of employees 
and applied the production/administration dichotomy.249  Both the 
Reiseck and Davis cases are evidence of the Second Circuit prop­
erly applying the 2004 regulations. 
Conversely, the majority of the reviewing courts have not met 
the DOL’s directive to construe the FLSA broadly in favor of em­
ployees.250  The First Circuit ignored the directive of the DOL in 
246. See, e.g., Herman v. Fabri-Ctrs. of Am., Inc. 308 F.3d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 
2002). The FLSA is “‘remedial and humanitarian in purpose,’ and ‘must not be inter­
preted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner.’” Id. (quoting Tennessee Coal, Iron & 
R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944). 
247. See supra Part III. 
248. To that end, the 2004 regulations limited the administrative exemption to 
only those employees whose “work directly relate[d] to assisting with the running or 
servicing of the business” as distinguished from production or selling.  29 C.F.R. 
§ 541.201(a) (2004); see supra Part III. 
249. See, e.g., Reiseck v. Universal Commc’ns of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d 101, 108 
(2d Cir. 2010).  The court’s treatment of the advertising space the plaintiff sold as the 
“product” of the employer magazine in the Reiseck case is an example of such broad 
construction. Id. at 106-07.  Also, the court applied the production/administration di­
chotomy in holding that because Ms. Reiseck’s primary duty was to sell the product of 
the magazine, her work fell into the production category, and thus did not contribute to 
the business of running the business. Id. at 107. See also Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 
587 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 2009).  The court construed the FLSA broadly by holding the 
loans sold by the plaintiff underwriter to be a “product” of the bank. Id. at 534.  Addi­
tionally, in determining the plaintiff was not exempt, the court referenced the specific 
section of the regulations addressing the production/administration dichotomy. Id. at 
535.  The Second Circuit effectively established a rule that intangible goods, such as the 
loan products which were the subject of the Davis case, can be considered “products” 
under the FLSA. Id. at 532. 
250. See, e.g., Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2010), Cash 
v. Cycle Craft Co., Inc., 508 F.3d 680 685-86 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Darveau v. 
Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 337-39 (4th Cir. 2008). The Fourth Circuit failed to con­
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243 2012] SALESPEOPLE AND FLSA EXEMPTIONS 
the 2004 regulations in Cash v. Cycle Craft Co., Inc.251  Despite the 
fact that the plaintiff’s role appeared to clearly fall on the produc­
tion side of selling motorcycles, the First Circuit explicitly shunned 
the broad application of the FLSA favoring employees and found 
the plaintiff to be exempt from the overtime requirements.252 
In Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, the Third Circuit also held that 
the plaintiff qualified as an exempt administrative employee.253  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court relied on limited facts, such as 
the fact that the plaintiff developed her own strategic plan to exe­
cute the duties of her position.254  The court disregarded the dichot­
omy test within the regulations, ignoring the fact that the plaintiff’s 
primary duty was to sell the product of the employer pharmaceuti­
cal sales company.255 
2. The 2010 Administrator’s Interpretation 
In the 2010 Administrator’s Interpretation, the DOL strongly 
posited that sales personnel within the mortgage loan industry were 
not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime protections.256  In making 
such a determination, the DOL again relied on the production/ad­
strue the regulations broadly by holding the plaintiff salesperson exempt from FLSA 
overtime protections. Id. at 338.  The plaintiff’s work was analogous to a line worker 
producing the product of the company for which he worked.  Here, the company prod­
uct was wireless telecommunication service. Id. at 336.  Darveau “produced” the cell 
service by selling the service to new customers. Contra id. at 338-39.  His contribution 
to the company did not advance the overall policies of the business. Contra id. at 339. 
In addition, Darveau had no authority to make independent decisions, and therefore 
did not perform his duties with discretion and independent judgment. Contra id. at 338­
39.  Had the Fourth Circuit construed regulations broadly, the court would have held 
that Darveau qualified for overtime compensation.  Interestingly, in support of its hold­
ing, the court referenced the 2006 Wage and Hour Opinion letter, subsequently with­
drawn by the DOL. Id. at 338. See supra Part III.A (discussing DOL withdrawal of 
2006 Wage and Hour Opinion letter). 
251. Cash, 508 F.3d 686. 
252. Id.  The court determined the plaintiff did not coordinate motorcycle order­
ing or delivery, nor did he supervise any employees. Id. at 682.  Although he occasion­
ally attended management meetings, his role was merely to report to management 
about the status of pick-up and delivery of the products sold—the motorcycles. Id. 
“Often, after Cash provided these reports, [the manager] told him to leave the meet­
ing.” Id.  “In sum, Cash did not simply produce a product; he exercised independent 
judgment as he engaged in the company’s business operations.” Id. at 686. 
253. Smith, 593 F.3d at 285. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. 
256. ADMINISTRATOR’S  INTERPRETATION  NO. 2010-1, supra note 14; see supra 
Part III.A. 
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244 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:205 
ministration dichotomy within the regulations.257  The Department 
enunciated standards that apply to salespeople in general, in addi­
tion to mortgage loan officers.258  The AI is entitled to controlling 
deference, as the DOL’s interpretation of the regulations in the AI 
is neither clearly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulations.259 
To be sure, courts have struggled with the level of deference to 
give agency-issued pronouncements such as Opinion Letters and 
other interpretive materials.260  However, in United States v. Mead 
Corp.,261 the Supreme Court enunciated a “category” of agency in­
terpretations that should still be afforded controlling deference, de­
spite the fact that the interpretation did not involve formal 
rulemaking procedure such as notice and comment.262  In other 
words, lack of formal rulemaking procedure was not dispositive of 
controlling deference.263  If Congress intended to establish control­
ling deference, courts should accord such deference.264 
257. ADMINISTRATOR’S  INTERPRETATION  NO. 2010-1, supra note 14; see supra 
Part III.A. 
258. ADMINISTRATOR’S  INTERPRETATION  NO. 2010-1, supra note 14; see supra 
Part III.A.  The AI stated that an employee who had the primary duty of sales qualified 
as a non-exempt production employee under the FLSA.  In addition, the AI indicated 
that in order to determine whether an employee’s primary duty was making sales, 
“work performed incidental to sales should . . . also be considered sales work.” ADMIN­
ISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14 (emphasis added). 
259. See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 390 (2008). 
260. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587-88 (2000) (finding 
opinion letters and guidance documents do not warrant controlling deference); Kilgore 
v. Outback Steakhouses of Fla., Inc., 160 F.3d 294, 303 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding a DOL 
opinion letter unpersuasive). Contra Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 
158, 171 (2007) (controlling deference given to an agency’s advisory memorandum); 
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2002) (determining that an agency’s informal 
pronouncement was entitled to controlling deference regardless of the lack of notice 
and comment rulemaking). 
261. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). 
262. Id. at 230-31. 
263. Id. at 231.  The court’s position regarding notice and comment in Mead was 
a shift in thinking. See, e.g., Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 167-69 (7th Cir. 
1996) (holding that if an agency pronouncement is intended to be binding, notice and 
comment is required). 
264. Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 AD­
MIN. L. REV. 771, 774 (2002). The Mead Court indicated that if “a plausible case 
[could] be made that Congress would want . . . a delegation [of rulemaking authority] to 
mean that agencies enjoy primary interpretational authority,” controlling deference 
should apply to informal agency procedures. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 n.11 (quoting 
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 872 
(2001)) (emphasis added).  This position is not without its detractors, however.  Profes­
sor Levin argues “the congressional intent criterion would . . . give . . . lower courts 
essentially no meaningful guidance.”  Levin, supra at 774.  Levin indicates a better 
reading of Mead would interpret an agency’s action as binding, or having the force of 
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245 2012] SALESPEOPLE AND FLSA EXEMPTIONS 
The 2010 AI falls within the category of agency interpretations 
deserving of controlling deference enunciated in the Mead case. 
The DOL was given the express authority to administer and en­
force the FLSA.265  In order to properly meet this directive, the 
DOL must ensure the regulations are interpreted and applied cor­
rectly.  Indeed, the preamble to the 2004 regulations describes the 
DOL’s “statutory duty to define and delimit the section 13(a)(1) 
exemptions from time to time.”266  By issuing the AI, the DOL has 
met this statutory directive by clarifying what it described to be a 
“misleading assumption and selective and narrow analysis” enunci­
ated in the 2006 Opinion Letter regarding mortgage industry sales 
personnel.267  As the preamble to the regulations makes clear, their 
purpose is to both restore overtime protections where they had 
eroded over time, and to bring the FLSA in line with the changes to 
the American workplace since the statute was enacted.268  Classify­
ing mortgage salespeople as production workers entitled to over­
time compensation as the AI did meets these goals of the amended 
regulations.  As such, the AI is entitled to controlling deference. 
While this Note argues that the AI qualifies for controlling def­
erence pursuant to the principles in Mead, the AI is still entitled to 
persuasive deference if a court finds otherwise. The Mead holding 
indicates that if a court determines that an agency’s interpretation is 
not entitled to controlling deference, this does not place it “outside 
the pale of any deference whatever.”269  The rule regarding control­
ling deference did not displace, but merely supplemented the rule 
from Skidmore v. Swift & Co.270 Skidmore argued that agency in­
terpretations are entitled to some deference.271  The reasons for 
law, “if it alters or determines legal rights or obligations.” Id. at 775. Either reading of 
Mead, however, would yield the same result.  Because the Administrator’s Interpreta­
tion does not answer a specific set of facts, it is intended to have binding effect on the 
exempt status of a particular category of worker, here, salespeople. 
265. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 204(a)-(b), 211(a), 216(c), 217 (2006). 
266. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,122 (internal quotations omitted). 
267. ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14, at 8. 
268. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,122. See supra Part III.A (discussing the 
Final Rule).  “By way of this rulemaking, the Department seeks to restore the overtime 
protections intended by the FLSA . . . which have eroded over the decades.  In addition, 
workplace changes . . . and federal case law developments are not reflected in the cur­
rent regulations.”  Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,122. 
269. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001). 
270. Skidmore et al. v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
271. Id. at 139 (“The weight of [the agency’s interpretation] will depend upon the 
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.”). 
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246 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:205 
such deference are twofold.  First, an agency such as the DOL is 
considered the expert in the field addressed in the litigation.272  The 
agency has access to “broader investigations and information” than 
that which is available to courts interpreting a particular statute.273 
Second, uniform application of the law is essential.274  It would 
be fundamentally unfair for a mortgage broker, for example, work­
ing for one bank to be ineligible for overtime compensation, while a 
broker working for a different bank would be entitled to overtime 
pay for identical job duties.  At the same time, employers need a 
uniform standard by which to classify salespeople in order to avoid 
costly litigation.275  Deferring to the DOL’s position classifying 
salespeople as production workers ensures the FLSA will be en­
forced in a uniform manner. 
The DOL itself reinforced this principle in the Preamble to the 
2004 regulations, which indicated the regulations were being up­
dated “to ensure that employees could understand their rights, em­
ployers could understand their legal obligations, and the 
Department could vigorously enforce the law.”276  Therefore, even 
if the AI does not qualify for controlling deference, because it is 
thorough in its analysis, well-reasoned, and consistent with the 2004 
regulations, it is entitled to persuasive deference under 
Skidmore.277 
272. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234. 
273. Id. (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139). 
274. Id. 
275. The current pharmaceutical industry litigation is an example of why a clear 
standard for classifying sales personnel is warranted.  As indicated earlier in this Note, 
courts reviewing the exempt status of pharmaceutical sales representative have differed 
in their classification of such workers.  Without a clear standard, some pharmaceutical 
companies have found themselves subject to large judgments, while others have 
avoided liability. See In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011). Contra Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 
635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011). 
276. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,122. 
277. Some scholars suggest that even when courts apply persuasive Skidmore def­
erence as opposed to controlling Chevron deference, courts are more likely to defer to 
the agency’s interpretation. See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search 
of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1275 (2007).  In a sample 
of courts applying the Skidmore standard, deference to an agency was given approxi­
mately sixty percent of the time. Id. 
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3. The Amicus Brief on Behalf of the Plaintiffs in Novartis 
The DOL’s amicus brief in the Novartis case278 is entitled to 
controlling deference as it can be considered an interpretation of 
the DOL’s own regulation.279  Since 1945, courts have held that an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations should be upheld “un­
less it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”280 
The Secretary of Labor enunciated this standard in the amicus 
brief, stating “[t]his principle holds true whether the Secretary’s in­
terpretation is found in a Preamble to a final rule published in the 
Federal Register, an opinion letter or other interpretive materials, 
or in a legal brief.”281 
In Auer v. Robbins,282 the Supreme Court addressed the spe­
cific issue of the level of deference due the DOL’s interpretation of 
the regulatory test for exempt employees when the interpretation 
came in the form of an amicus brief.283  The Court indicated that 
the fact that the DOL’s interpretation was enunciated in an infor­
mal agency pronouncement such as an amicus brief was of no con­
sequence, as the brief was an agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulation.284 
Petitioners complain that the Secretary’s interpretation comes to 
us in the form of a legal brief; but that does not, in the circum­
stances of this case, make it unworthy of deference . . . . There is 
simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not re­
flect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in 
question.285 
278. Amicus Brief, supra note 14.  In the brief, the Secretary took the position 
that the plaintiffs were not exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA as the 
plaintiffs did not exercise discretion and independent judgment in carrying out the du­
ties of their respective jobs. Id. at 7. 
279. See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008) (“Just as 
[the courts] defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretations of the statute when it issues 
regulations in the first instance, . . . the agency is entitled to further deference when it 
adopts a reasonable interpretation of regulations it has put in force.”); Auer v. Robbins, 
519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
280. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see also Fed. 
Express Corp., 552 U.S. at 397; Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. 
281. Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 7 n.3. 
282. Auer, 519 U.S. 452. 
283. Id. at 461. 
284. Id. at 462. 
285. Id. 
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The amicus brief is not “‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.’”286  In fact, in determining that the pharmaceutical 
sales representatives did not exercise the requisite discretion and 
independent judgment, the Secretary referenced specific sections of 
the regulations.287  A reading of the regulations indicating that sales 
reps did not exercise discretion and independent judgment in per­
forming their job duties is simply an interpretation the Secretary is 
entitled to make and courts are required to respect.  Because the 
DOL is entitled to deference in interpreting the FLSA, and the in­
terpretation is neither erroneous nor inconsistent with the regula­
tion, reviewing courts should defer to the holding in the amicus 
brief and find that salespeople do not qualify for the administrative 
exemption. 
CONCLUSION 
The FLSA is one of the most important worker protections in 
America.288  The Act’s overtime protections have afforded benefits 
to millions of employees throughout its history.289  In light of the 
devastating effect the recent “Great Recession” has had on the 
American worker, the protections of the FLSA are as relevant now 
as they ever were.290  Due to the broad remedial nature of the stat­
ute, any exemptions to the FLSA must be narrow and limited.291 
The FLSA should therefore apply as though there is a presumption 
against the exemptions. 
Salespeople, as service personnel, are analogous to the line 
worker or production workers in the original FLSA, and among the 
category of worker the FLSA was established to protect.292  By 
analogizing salespeople to production workers, salespeople gener­
ally fall outside the boundaries of the administrative exemption. 
The production/administration dichotomy has been a useful tool in 
286. Id. at 461 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 
(1945)). 
287. Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 12 (referencing 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.202(e), 
541.203(g)-(i) (2004)). 
288. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,123. 
289. Id. 
290. See, e.g., Great Recession Transforms the Workplace, MSNBC.COM (Sept. 27, 
2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33020534/ns/business-success_in_hard_times 
(“The Great Recession has reshaped the American workplace and work force in ways 
that will last years, if not longer . . . . Perhaps the most enduring change is the perma­
nent loss of millions of jobs across the manufacturing, services and retail sectors.”). 
291. Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960). 
292. ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14 (quoting Fi­
nal Rule, supra note 27, at 22,141). 
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extending the protections of the FLSA to the greatest number of 
workers. 
There are myriad benefits to evaluating sales personnel as pro­
duction workers.  First, it creates a uniform system of employee 
classification.  Such a classification promotes both just administra­
tion of the law and efficiency within the legal system.  A uniform 
standard will enable employers to ensure similarly situated workers 
are subject to the FLSA overtime pay provision in the same man­
ner.  At the same time, uniformity will prevent one employer not 
required to pay overtime wages from having an unfair economic 
advantage over another employer in the same industry who is re­
quired.  A uniform system minimizes misclassification of employ­
ees.  Employers will have guidance regarding which employees are 
entitled to overtime, preventing the unfair surprise of a judgment 
indicating large sums of overtime pay are due employees.  Proper 
classification will also reduce time consuming and costly litigation, 
promoting efficiency in the judicial system. 
Through recent regulation and informal interpretive rules, the 
DOL has succeeded in both extending the protections of the FLSA 
to the greatest number of workers and creating a uniform system of 
employee classification.  Classifying sales personnel as production 
workers and applying the requirements of the FLSA overtime pro­
vision as if there is a presumption against any exemptions furthers 
these goals.  The DOL is entitled to deference both because it has 
been charged with the duty of enforcing the FLSA and it is inter­
preting its own regulations.  Reviewing courts should follow the 
lead of both the DOL and the Second Circuit, and find, as a general 
rule, salespeople do not qualify for the administrative exemption. 
Like the production workers protected by the original iteration of 
the FLSA, salespeople are entitled to protection under the Act and 
should be paid overtime compensation. 
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